

Class Notes & Critical Comments

by

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**A Paper Submitted to Dr. Colin Brown
of the School of Theology
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TH531: KIERKEGAARD**

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OPENING COMMENTS¹

Three warnings about this course:

1) This course is not a substitute for introductory survey courses in philosophy. If it is to be counted as CORE then you have to have some type of philosophical background already, perhaps in ones first degree. Don't treat this as some sort of alternative to the sort of thing that Dr. Rogers does, i.e. as an entry level overview of either the main philosophers or the main movements in philosophy. This is a specialized, "odd", sort of course.

2) This is not a practical course. It's not a How-to course. It's not a package of certain facts or skills that are going to help you out there in ministry, as such, like these were readily adaptable and so on. It's not going to do that for you.

On the other hand it is my experience that, well Kierkegaard is odd. He's the oddest character that Brown knows in the whole of academic curriculum. And yet, he does certain things for people, unpredictable things. And it can be a life changing experience to read Kierkegaard, and one might be able to see things and feel things in a new light. And that's why Brown feels that Kierkegaard is valuable.

3) Brown's understanding of Kierkegaard differs from practically all of the standard Evangelical opinions that one may have heard regarding Kierkegaard, especially the stuff epitomized by Francis Scheaffer. There is one Evangelical scholar who is an outstanding Kierkegaard scholar, Steven Evans (he did Ph.D. work at Yale, he published a book on Kierkegaard and he is now curator of Kierkegaard library at a University in Minnesota, which is the Kierkegaard center in America). One of his books is listed on the course outline.

Apart from that, Brown says that he is out of step with the mainstream of Evangelical thinking regarding Kierkegaard. Why? He has come to the conviction that guys like Scheaffer never really read Kierkegaard. In fact he doesn't think that Francis Scheaffer ever read anybody whom he discussed in his books. He might have read short articles or other people's opinions, and its very easy to take Kierkegaard out of context and not get a hold of what he's saying.

All Brown wants to do, he says, is put in a plea for us

¹**Please note:** superscripted numbers found in the text (normally used to refer to footnotes) refer to a comments given in the section called Critical Comments that is located at the end of these lecture notes.

to read Kierkegaard for ourselves and form our own opinions.

Excursis: Fuller and the "Party-line"

At Orientation Brown was struck (actually afterwards) regarding the Theology Department "Interviews", something that made him glad to be a part of Fuller, with the thought that the Professors are individuals that are prepared, and want to read the texts for themselves. Jack Rogers was saying that he went to Amsterdam to study the Westminster Confession (he did his Ph.D. on the Westminster Confession) but as he read the confession and the works of the people who framed the Confession he came to the conviction that what they actually believed was something different from the "Received" Wisdom.

And Brown feels that if one goes down the list of the faculty, Bradley, Muller, etc., and one looks at what they're writing, they are people who want to get to the bottom of things and study the texts for themselves. And that if we only learn one thing from this course then the thing to learn is we should form our own opinions. We shouldn't be content with second hand opinions. What we're trying to get what Kierkegaard said, trying to understand it. To see what bearing it has.

Aims of the Course:

1) **General Overview:** Brown wants to give a bird's eye view (actually his own view), an overview or survey, of Kierkegaard; to try to give us a feel for who he was, what his background was, what his writings were like; just a general overview.

2) **Philosophic Background of Kierkegaard:** Brown wants to sketch some of the background. He wants to talk about some of the philosophers and writers whom he is responding to. In other words he wants to say something about

Kant
Hegel
Lessing
Schelling

because these people figure in Kierkegaard's writings. One cannot understand what he's doing or where he's going without some grasp of the positions of the people listed above.

3) **Discussion of Selected Writings of Kierkegaard:** This is the main course of the class. (The selection is listed on the course outline and found in Robert Bretall's A Kierkegaard Anthology).

Mechanics of the Course:

(Found in the course outline)

Comments on "The Books":

(Books listed in the course outline). Brown says that he would be hard pressed to say what the best buy would be for the Kierkegaard library.

Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship, Produced in the 60's (still in print?), a useful handbook on all of the things that Kierkegaard wrote with an introduction and a brief analysis of each book. Good but dated.

Brown, Jesus in European Protestant Thought, 1778-1860, Ph.D. research, chapter on Kierkegaard (really on Kierkegaard and his Christology).

Carnell, The Burden of Soren Kierkegaard, valiant book written twenty years ago. Independent thinker, useful book.

Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History, important and interesting book comparing Kierkegaard and Hegel.

Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, dense difficult book.

Dupre, Kierkegaard as Theologian, Roman Catholic scholar, a very enlightening book.

Elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom, a very interesting and important book, especially dealing with the social and religious background of the Danish Lutheran church.

Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript": The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus, it might sound obscure and difficult judging by the title but it is central to understanding what Kierkegaard is doing. Evans published a brief article in Christianity Today (Sept 84), that was howled by the bearers of the torch of the Sainted Scheaffer.

Fenger, Kierkegaard, The Myths and their Origins, a contemporary Danish scholar, this work is somewhat iconoclastic, that is, he is knocking Kierkegaard. But it does contain a lot of useful material. He thinks that Kierkegaard was a self-conscious poser. Brown feels that he was self-conscious and that he did strike poses. Brown finds chapter three of this book, "Kierkegaard in the Doctor's Office," most interesting in reviewing different theories about what was wrong with Kierkegaard.

Hannay, Kierkegaard, a good book for grasping Kierkegaard's philosophy

Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers and Letters and Documents,

latter is part of a new critical edition. It has a good chronology, or list of what was taking place during (before and after ?) Kierkegaard's lifetime (pages ix-xv) and various maps of Copenhagen and environ in the back of the book.

Lowrie, Kierkegaard (2 vol), important Kierkegaard scholar.

Mackey, Kierkegaard, A Kind of Poet, Mackey's theory is that many have attempted to analyze Kierkegaard as a philosopher (the Grandfather of Existentialism, etc.) but few people have taken seriously Kierkegaard's own description of himself as a Poet.

Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, important analysis of Kierkegaard as a philosopher.

Michealson, Lessing's "Ugly Ditch", odd title, question of history and significant religious truth.

Smith, Kierkegaard's Truth, psychological study.

Stendahl, Soren Kierkegaard, short study.

Sponhiem, Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian Coherence, a bit complicated but important study.

Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel, Commentary on Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript with a New Introduction, and Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, "commentary" deals with Kierkegaard's intellectual background (thus best overview of Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard), and annotation of Kierkegaard's works and its illusions.

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I. GENERAL OVERVIEW

A. Background and Writings

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1. Kierkegaard was born and died in Copenhagen. He was born in 1813 and died in 1855. There are two unusual acts about Kierkegaard that, according to Brown, are worth noting.

- a. He never worked for his living. He is the only thinker in modern European history who never actually earned his living. The only qualification is that for four days he did "earn" his living. That is on November 1st, 1830 he was conscripted into the military. He was discharged as unfit for service on November 4th. Thus he possibly was paid for those four days. But for the rest he seems to have been supported by his father and the inheritance that he got from his father. And of course as the 1840's wore on the money began to dwindle. He certainly did earn money from his writings. Some sold maybe 250 to 300 copies. These are books that he published at his own expense. It cost him

money to publish.

b. Kierkegaard was like a kind of time-bomb in his influence. In his own day he was regarded as a crank, a bit of a nut-case, a bit of an eccentric, maybe one who had a brilliant but who was so eccentric that he could be safely disregarded. One book that did sell was Either/Or, and that had to be reprinted during his lifetime. But even so that was done sort of on the side, not so much to make money, but as a sort of confession. Part of the reason that he was regarded as an eccentric in Denmark was because he did not hold a university position nor was ordained (though he would have liked to have been). To extract influence one had to hold a position. If you didn't hold a university position than you weren't taken seriously. Moreover, Kierkegaard wrote in Danish, and few knew Danish except the Danes.

His tutor, H.L. Martensen (later Professor and Bishop) wrote a Dogmatics and a Christian Ethics. They were translated. And if you were living in England or America or Germany in the 19th century and were asked who was the most important thinker in Denmark in the 19th century, one would have said Martensen or as a distant runner-up one would have said Kierkegaard, but not Soren, Pater Kierkegaard (Soren's older brother, who was a bishop, who got a Ph.D. in Germany).

It wasn't until well towards the end of the 19th century that Kierkegaard writing began to be collected in a complete (or semi-complete) edition. Then early on in the 20th century they were translated into German and this had an impact on people like Karl Barth and Paul Tillich in the first decade or so. This period would be up to the First World War. His influence reached the English speaking world in the 1930's chiefly through the Princeton translation (Oxford University also publish a one volume German edition which was translated by a Roman Catholic gentleman farmer named Alexander Dru). So from there Kierkegaard had this delayed reaction and influence.

2. Kierkegaard life was lived against a background of national turmoil. When he was born in 1813 Europe was still dominated by Napoleon (in that year was the battle of Leipzig, of the Battle of Nations, which was Napoleon's first defeat in Europe following his return from Russia). Napoleon had little puppet rulers in numerous places and countries were going bankrupt. And Denmark went bust, was officially declared bankrupt in 1813 (the year of Soren Kierkegaard's birth). The power and influence of Denmark shrank during his lifetime. Towards the end of his lifetime Denmark was involved in a conflict with Prussia (Germany). Culturally Denmark was overshadowed by Germany. Throughout Kierkegaard's life the state church (Lutheran Church) was struggling to find a role in the National life of Denmark. This needs to be seen from Kierkegaard's eyes and from the eyes of his contemporaries.

Should Church and State be separate? Kierkegaard said,

"Yes!" But some felt otherwise because Denmark had long been a country which professed Christianity and they felt that the Church should hang in there and try to keep Denmark a Christian country. Kierkegaard believed that this was just nominal Christianity and as such was more dangerous to Christianity than outright perdition.

The Danish church tried to come to terms with modern Democracy. Bishop J. P. Mynster struck a dealing with the leading political party which secured recognition for the Danish Lutheran Church in the National Life. Kierkegaard felt that this was a betrayal.

However earlier in his life Kierkegaard was not estranged from the Danish church. His father, Micheal Pedersen Kierkegaard, was a respected member of the church. He had been a well-to-do business man who retired early in order to devote himself to Religious works. He was a personal friend of Mynster long before Mynster became a bishop (Mynster was the minister of the church where the Kierkegaard family came to worship). Mynster prepared Soren for confirmation in 1828 and became bishop of Sjælland (as in New Zealand) in 1834. In 1837 Soren wrote in his journal, "I was brought up on Mynster's sermons by my father, this is the problem. Of course it never occurred to my father to take those sermons otherwise than literally. Brought up on Mynster's sermons, yes a problem." (See, Journals & Papers, 6073, vol 5, p 415).

Micheal Pedersen Kierkegaard had a mixed background. When we encounter him at this point and time, he is a devote Lutheran, but of Pietistic persuasion. He is somehow tied in with the Moravian Piety, which influenced the Wesleys, which is centered in Herrnhut in Germany (a branch of Piety that also belong to Schliermacher's background). Throughout his life M.P. Kierkegaard was haunted by a sense of guilt and divine retribution, which he passed onto his children. An example of this mentality would be the passage in the journals that refers to the Earthquake [See, Journals and Papers, 5430, vol 5, pp 140-11,

Then it was that the Great Earthquake occurred; The frightful upheaval which suddenly drove me to a new and final principal for interpreting all phenomenon. Then I surmised that my father's old age was not a divine blessing but rather a curse. That our family's exceptional intellectual capacities were for mutually howling one another. Then I felt the stillness of death deepen around me when I saw my father, an unhappy man who would survive us all. Above all a cross upon the grave of all his personal holdings. A guilt must rest upon the entire family, a punishment of God must be upon it. He was suppose to disappear, obliterated by the mighty hand of God, erased like a mistake and only at times did I find little relief in the thought that my father had been given the heavy duty of

assuring or reassurances with the consolation of religion, telling us that a better world stands open for us even if you have lost this one. Even if the punishment that the Jews called upon their enemies should strike us, that remembrance of us would be completely obliterated. We know that there would be no prisoners.

He is talking about how one should view life. The father was already old when Kierkegaard was born. But within a very short period of time the mother died and so did several brothers and sisters. How does a religious person look at life? How does a Christian look at life? Today's Christian's are concerned with Success. That is, if you're a born-again Christian and you put your hand in the hand of God, God will bless you. Health, wealth, happiness, these are the proper inheritance of the born-again Christian. Kierkegaard is saying prosperity is one thing. The father is living to an old age, but what is it bringing? Could it be that this prosperity, the longevity of his father, is really a divine curse on them? Why should this be? One theory has to do with the story about his father cursing God when he was a boy and so that anything that happened whether it was good time or bad times was a sort of Divine judgement from God. And that was part of the family background.

Kierkegaard was himself melancholic. He was frequently depressed which alternated with periods of rapture. But it was more complicated than all that. The father's early life held more than its share of indiscretion. His first wife died had died and one of the maids of the household was pregnant by the father. A hasty marriage was arranged, the boy was born [Pater, Soren's older brother]. There was a sense in the family of the "sins of the Father being visited upon the children." Some books portray a tension between the father and the son, which is no doubt true. Soren was a perpetual student, he matriculated at the University of Copenhagen in 1830. It took him ten years to secure his degree ["yet, but for the grace of God, there go I too . . .]. So there was, no doubt, some tension over the lack of progress in Soren, but there also seems to be a great deal of love and respect on the part of Soren toward his father. He dedicated many of his Christian discourses to his father. Ten years after his fathers death he recorded:

I am indebted to my father for everything, from the very beginning. Melancholy as he was, he saw me melancholy. And he appealed to me, "be sure that you really love Jesus Christ." [See, Journals & Papers, 6164, vol 6, p 12].

The emphasis in his father's heart is more toward obligation and duty than on grace; it is the overwhelming demands of Christianity is rather the important thing at this stage.

In 1830 he entered the university of Copenhagen.

Pater, while having his own troubles was more of a model student. He already had his doctorate from the University of Gottingen with a dissertation on the "Wretchedness of Lying" [it was a study on Ethics]. It took Soren ten years to get his B.A. and fulfill his ordination examinations. He then followed this up with a dissertation for his M.A. degree entitled: "The Concept of Irony with constant reference to Socrates." [1841] This was for an M.A. degree but in 1854 the University of Copenhagen decided that these M.A. degrees were actually doctorate degrees, so Soren became a Ph.D. just before his death. The ideas that he posed in this work was reiterated often in the works that followed; that Irony was the key to understanding life.

One of Kierkegaard's early tutors at the University was H.L. Martensen, who was a young rising scholar of the time. When Schliermacher [1833-1834] toured Scandinavia, he visited Copenhagen. By this time he was an international scholar. Martensen composed and recited a poem in Schliermacher's honor. Martensen was a rising. It was Martensen who introduced Kierkegaard to the writings of Schliermacher. He took him through an outline of the main themes of Schliermacher's important work, The Christian Faith. But Martensen was also interested in Hegel and there is an element of Hegelianism in his writings (though he was not Hegelian pure and simple).

It's during this period [1830's] that Kierkegaard is beginning to question Philosophy, and to ask, "What is the relationship between Philosophy and Christianity?" The Hegelians were saying that Hegelian Philosophy represents the Philosophical statement of the essential Truths of Christianity. Philosophy, then, was a key to Christianity. But during this period Kierkegaard is writing in his journal that, "Philosophy and Christianity can never be united". [See, Journals & Papers, 3245, vol 3, p 496-497].

There are several influences in Kierkegaard's thought at this time. One is J.G. Hamann, a contemporary of Kant, who was very critical of Kant, calling him the "Prussian Hume." Another [actually the most] influence was the professor of Philosophy at the University of Copenhagen, P.M. Moller. It was he who suggested that Kierkegaard study Socrates, particularly the idea of Irony.

Kierkegaard was still interested in the leading contemporary philosophers. Hegel died in 1831 (eliminating any chance of the two meeting). On the other hand Schelling was still alive and following the breakup of Kierkegaard's engagement, Kierkegaard went to Berlin to hear Schelling lecture. At first he wrote down everything that Schelling said and then went to his lodgings and recopied the notes in a more legible fashion. But gradually he got more and more disillusioned with Schelling. By the time that the Schelling lectures concluded Kierkegaard had given up on Philosophical Idealism.

It was during this period that he wrote Either/Or. In this work he discusses philosophy as being something like a sign in a shop window, "Washing done here." And in going to

that shop with your laundry you discover it's only the sign
that's for say, they don't do laundry.

Kierkegaard's Library

An idea of Kierkegaard's thought-life can be had by going through the list of books that he had in his library. He died virtually penniless but he had a library that contained more than 2,000 books [compiled from a list of these books sold at an auction of his possessions following his death]. They consist largely of literature, philosophy and theology. There's an edition of Shakespeare, and some English classics, but well over half the books were in German (1,280 versus 750 in Danish). Modern German literature is represented by the writings of Goethe, Lessing, various romantic writers and their contemporaries. Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and Schelling are all well represented. In theology he has editions of Luther, Augustine and Schliermacher. He also subscribed for many years to The Journal for Philosophy and Speculative Theology (published in Germany) which kept him abreast with current philosophical and theological movements.

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9/25/85

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I. GENERAL OVERVIEW

A. Background and Writings

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What Shaped Kierkegaard's Life?

In the last class session Kierkegaard's library was discussed. This is important in understanding Kierkegaard. But books weren't the only thing in Kierkegaard's life. One needs to gain the sense of what Kierkegaard was responding to. For him, responding, thinking and putting all of these thoughts on paper was more important than reading somebody else's material. Kierkegaard was never a professional scholar in the technical sense (though he hoped at one time to get a position at the university of Copenhagen, but he was too personal, to idiosyncratic).

Much has been attributed, in the way that he responded, in his thinking processes, to a physical deformity that he might have had. Some say that he was a hunchback. There's something of truth in that. Fenger (See, Kierkegaard, the Myths and their Origins) has a chapter in his book entitled "Kierkegaard in the Doctor's Office," in which he reviews these various theories. He certainly was a melancholic. He seem to display a certain psychological imbalance with bouts of depression and melancholy. he had a sort of compulsive detachment, whereas he seems to have wanted to go so far but he couldn't go all the way and enjoy what would be considered normal relationships. This certainly comes out in the story of the making and breaking of his engagement to Regine Olsen. His first book, Either/Or, was an attempt of explaining or at least trying to justify the breaking of the engagement in which he depicts himself as a terrible scoundrel, in a way saying to Regine that she would have been making a terrible mistake if she had married him. But time and time again, he comes back to the engagement and in the Journal one finds sections entitled "My Relationship to Her." He broke the engagement and he saw himself like Abraham sacrificing Isaac in Genesis 22, hoping against hope that just as God spared Isaac and restored him to Abraham so God would make it possible for them to be reconciled and to some day be married. And yet he felt that he was a monster, that he really couldn't marry Regine. Thus the engagement remained off. When Regine was eventually married to a former Fiancee Kierkegaard was shattered. He always cherished the relationship and when he died he left all of his property to her.

Why did he break off the engagement? The general answer is that he felt that there was a Divine imperative, that God was saying, "No," that he couldn't have and enjoy a normal married life. But why? No one has a conclusive answer (material for someone's Ph.D. dissertation?) Was it because of his compulsive detachment? Possibly. The same could be applied to the matter of his ordination. When he entered Copenhagen University he was studying theology. And

when he completed his degree he took his theological examinations but was never ordained. Why? It could be because he was one that could never enter into normal relationships. Brown thinks so.

Kierkegaard writes about his melancholy over and over again. Brown cites Saggaw who in turn proposes a theory regarding Kierkegaard's father contracting syphilis in his earlier wilder days and somehow passing it onto his children. There seems to be some truth here (which would explain the deaths of several of the children and Michael Pedersen's Kierkegaard's first wife . . .). Another variation of the same theme is that Soren Kierkegaard had some wild days of his own, got drunk, visited a brothel, fathered a child/contracted syphilis and from thence considered himself impure. The end result is that something in the past kept him from feeling that he could enter into a normal relationship (ministry or marriage) [See, Lowrie, vol 1, pp 116-149, esp. p 132ff]. So there were a multitude of shadows hang over his life, even after his conversion. Things that were done may be forgiven, but they will never be undone.

Kierkegaard's Writings

His writings fall into two broad categories:

ASTHETIC

books written under pseudonyms,
eg., Either/Or by Victor Eremita
(He who has victory by being a hermit),
an important one is Johannes Climacus
(John the climber), dating 1841-43 (middle
period of his life).

RELIGIOUS

These books from 1846-47 (works of the later period). These books include, Works of Love, Christian Discourses, Training in Christianity, and The Attack Upon Christendom.

Are these early works to be attributed to a speculative preconversion/postconversion grouping? No. All of Kierkegaard's writing from the very first are religious and Christian. There are three reasons to hold this view:

1. Content; all of the books, even the asthetic books have a religious aim.
2. He often published his works in pairs, an asthetic work accompanied by a discourse.
3. This is Kierkegaard's own point of view as expressed in the book The Point Of View Of My Work As An Author (1840's, but was published posthumously). He reviews his writings and comments that even in the asthetic work he felt that he was under "Divine Governance." (Somewhat like Providence, where Providence means Divine providing and Governance means Divine guiding). He says in this work that the Asthetic writings were a form of indirect witness, but his purpose

was the shape the illusions of Christendom by exploring the hollowness of the Asthetic. "The problem itself is a problem of reflection. To become a Christian when one is a Christian of a sort." [p 43] He was writing for cultured nominal Christians.

Part of the motive for the Asthetic writings is that one cannot just hand-out Religious or Christian truth on a platter. It's not a matter of simple argument, logical steps, simple tangible proofs and people would just be persuaded. These Asthetic writing are a contrived sort of use of the Maieutic method (from the Greek term maieutikos) which means "skilled as a mid-wife." The idea is not to impart information but to get them to see things, to get the truth to give birth to the truth. All of this follows the method used by Socrates (whom Kierkegaard studied, remember the M.A. thesis?) where his disciples were to get the truth for themselves. [See, Concept of Irony, pp 215-216, Journals & Papers, 649, vol 1, p 273, Philosophical Fragments, p 13].

Titles of the Asthetic Writings:

Either/Or: A Fragment of Life by Victor Eremiter (1843)
Fear & Trembling: A Dialectical Lyric by Johannes de Silencio (1843)

Philosophical Fragments by Johannes Climacus (1844)
The Concept of Dread: A Simple Deliberation on Psychological Minds in Direction of the Dogmatic Problem of Original Sin by Vigilius Harthniensis ("The Copenhagen watchman")

Stages on Life's Way: Studies by Various Persons, collected, forwarded to the Press and published by Hilarius Bookbinder (1844)

Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments: A Mimic Prophetic Dialectical Composition, An Existential Contribution by Johannes Climacus (1846)

With the publication of the Postscript Kierkegaard felt that he had finished. He had written what he wanted to write. If he had died then he would have been contented to be remembered with these writings accompanied by a series of discourses many of whom were dedicated to his father. He felt that at that time his main literary work was done and that he might retire and get ordained and have a small country church. It was discussed but nothing became of it.

He was attacked by a paper called the Coursair, something like today's National Enquirer which plunged him into deeper depths of introspection. Then during Holy Week in 1848 he had a Religious Experience: "My whole nature is changed. My concealment and enclosurement are broken. I am free to speak." But by Easter monday he wrote that his enclosings still cannot be broken. [See, April 19 & 24, 1848, Journals & Papers, 6131 & 6133, vol 5, pp 443ff]. By this time he was running out of cash and was living under simpler conditions.

Kierkegaard has a sort of mid-life crisis (in view

of the fact that he died when he was relatively young, at 42). Kierkegaard's use of the word "Aesthetic" was partly in response to the Hegelian notion that Beauty and Truth run together; that the great works of art and literature are just one step away from deep religious experiences. This is the idea that the Aesthetic experience is a form of the religious experience. The book Either/Or says that either you can have the aesthetic experience and go in for that, or you can be ethical, but you shouldn't confuse the two. Kierkegaard is a Dualist. Brown feels that in his book Dualism is not a bad term. Kierkegaard is trying to use the weapons of the aesthetics against the aesthete (?).

To a certain extent Either/Or misfired. People were amused by the book. They liked the "Diary of a Seducer." They enjoyed the humor but they didn't get the point of the book.

In the later years there is a change. The Aesthetic works were largely directed against a quasi-Christian aestheticism. It was also directed against the Hegelian thought that said, "All this and heaven too." But in the latter years, 1846 and following, he drops the pseudonyms and begins to write more directly about Christianity. The works of these years include: Works of Love (1847), Christian Discourses (1848), Training in Christianity (by Anticlimacus, 1950), Attack Upon Christendom.

Mynster is a key figure in Danish Christian history. He is pictured as a kind and elderly gentleman in a portrait found in Jerry Gill's book on Kierkegaard. Brown feels that if we had been around during Mynster's lifetime he would most likely be viewed as an Evangelical Statesman. Although he was most likely sincere to Kierkegaard his ways were of willful compromise. Mynster said one thing in his sermons on Sunday, but when he got into his office on Monday he was a "Wheeler-dealer", a Church politician, according to Kierkegaard. But then again you can't become a Church leader in that sphere (Bishop of Copenhagen) without getting into Church politics and National politics. Mynster was one that wanted to take a stand for Christianity and to be a part of public life. Kierkegaard saw this stance as hollow. Mynster died in 1853. And in 1854 Dr. Martensen, Kierkegaard's former tutor, delivered a memorial address for Mynster saying that he had been a great witness to the Truth. But Kierkegaard felt that whatever else he had been, he had not been a great witness to the truth. He just sold out for whatever would work. Following this period Kierkegaard did nothing. Eventually he began to publish short essays in a journal called The Fatherland that became more and more strikingly critical of the established Church. It was a great scandal. It was in bad taste to criticize the dead, especially in view of the relationship between Mynster and the Kierkegaard family. So Kierkegaard, in his early forties, found himself again at the center of another controversy. He collapsed in the street in Copenhagen, was taken to the hospital, and survived a month or two. He was serene and confident, refusing to take communion from an old

friend and confidant, Emil Boesen, who as a Lutheran minister was called "The Kings Official." Kierkegaard died at the age of 42, prematurely aged, leaving barely enough money to pay the hospital bills and funeral expenses.

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B. Kierkegaard's Approach

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What Motivated Kierkegaard?

Kierkegaard's approach was dictated partly by his reaction to Hegel and all that Hegel stands for in Kierkegaard's mind. Hegel stands for, primarily the Idealist tradition which wanted to replace the Transcendent God (Dualistic Reality) with a kind of monism in which Spirit/Being is the ultimate reality and the phenomenon was simply an expression of the Spirit/Being (a form of Pantheism). Kierkegaard was utterly opposed to this type of thinking. He was impressed by Socrates and Socratic Irony. His Socratic approach is diametrically opposed to the Hegelian approach. Above all he is impressed with the sense of the "Otherness of God." (There are affinities where between Kierkegaard and Barth [especially early Barth]). He is also impressed with the personal character of New Testament Christianity in contrast to the relatively easy conformist type of Christianity of the Church of Kierkegaard's day. Not all of these elements are equally represented in every one of his writings. It depends upon the focus and aim of the piece.

What's wrong with Hegelianism? This comes out of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript:

- 1) It is indemonstrable,
- 2) It is irrelevant,
- 3) It rests upon a confusion of categories.

For Kierkegaard it is a form of skepticism which might sound odd because Hegelianism was an attempt to provide a comprehensive account of Reality. But it was an account of Reality that was compatible with everything which couldn't be falsified or verified. Kierkegaard says that a philosophy of pure thought is as useful as a map of Europe with Denmark represented as a pinpoint when trying to navigate the streets of Copenhagen. What good is it? It's a confusion of categories according to Kierkegaard. At the center Kierkegaard is Kantian. He, at least, has learned various lessons from Kant. One thing that Kierkegaard accepts from Kant is the distinction between Purely logical statements and empirical statements. A purely logical statement would be, "A sister is a female sibling." This statement is true, but it has no real connection to an actual reality. An empirical statement would be, "Joyce is my sister," in which case the state can be verified by discovery such a person related to me. Kierkegaard's objection to Hegelianism is that it's a quasi-logical series of definitions with nothing to confirm or falsify the truth of the definitions in view of Reality and therefore the system is simply irrelevant.

Another part of Kierkegaard's objection to Hegelianism is that the system holds that the height of Being is the Aesthetic (Art, Music, Beauty). But Kierkegaard is well aware that one can be an Aesthete's Aesthete and be worlds away from knowing God, and worlds away from experiencing grace and forgiveness. Therefore there is a confusion there.

Kant's major work is the Critique of Pure Reason. Brown suggests that if one would put together Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript one would have Kierkegaard's "Critique of Pure Reason." He is criticizing the limits of reason. How far can reason get you?

In The Philosophical Fragments he is grappling with the question of Knowing God and encountering God and in particular the relevance of History and historical events for knowing God now. Christianity is clearly understood to be a "Historical Religion." What is meant here is that Christians believe in an Incarnation that took place at a particular time in history, etc. The question is can religion be truly based on a historical event? Thinkers of the Age of Enlightenment said, "Clearly no!" (in particular Lessing). Kierkegaard has given a different answer. He knows that some very great minds have come up against this problem. History can only embody instances of eternal truth, but nothing in history can be absolutely decisive in the salvation of the world. This is the problem that Kierkegaard is wrestling with in the Philosophical Fragments.

In the Philosophical Fragments he starts off with a Socratic inquiry: How far does the truth admit of being learnt? [See, p. 11]. What is involved in learning it? This presents for Kierkegaard a Socratic dilemma, namely,

One cannot seek for what one knows, and equally it seem impossible for what he does not know. For what a man knows, he cannot seek, since he knows it. And what he does not know he cannot seek since he doesn't even know what to seek. [p. 11]

It's not like looking for a lost watch, God, if unknown to us, is not something that we would "Naturally" seem familiar with. We are seeking new knowledge. But, can you seek that which you don't know. Kierkegaard points out that Socrates solved this problem with the doctrine of Recollection ("Remembering"). This is all tied up with Socrates' belief in the pre-existence of each human being in a previous life, in an eternal existence. This doctrine is illustrated in Plato with a question put to a slave boy involving geometry which the slave boy works through not being educated in geometry. How did he get that knowledge? Plato says that he got it in a previous existence (so this problem was solved by means of recalling previous learning in another existence). Scientology uses this mentality (doctrine) of

previous existences to explain the psychological problems that we experience now. Needless to say this is all a bunch of bunk. But even with regards to Plato later thinkers felt that the boy wasn't recalling anything at all, but step by step, using reason, solving the problem for himself. In all of this Socrates is the midwife.

Kierkegaard applies this to knowing God. You can't seek what you know already, this is the problem. How then can this be so. For Kierkegaard God is wholly Other. God is a different kind of Being from any being that we know. It's a question involving the finitude of our own existence. Everything that we know involves or is set up against the background of time and space. But suppose that you don't know God to begin with. How do we get to know God? For Kierkegaard this is an acute problem. And it is, according to Brown a deeper statement of the problem that traditionally theologians have said it's Revelation. We don't know God to begin with, or we've lost the knowledge of God and so God revealed himself. This is basically Kierkegaard's answer, but he reflects more deeply. Supposing we agree that God is other, that he is a different kind of being who exists, not in time and space, but on his own plain, how can we know this God? His answer is basically that there is no way in which we, as human beings, can work our way up to God (either by reason or rational argument), we need revelation. But how does this affect God? How can God reveal himself to us? His answer is that God can reveal himself in an intelligible way only by assuming some form that is recognizable to us, i.e., in time and space (he's thinking mainly about the Incarnation of Jesus Christ). But what happens in the Incarnation? What would happen if we would see Jesus Christ walk through the door and start lecturing? Hopefully, Brown says, he would have the grace to let Jesus take over. But how would we know that it was Jesus Christ? We could appeal to his similarity to various pictures that we've seen of Jesus Christ (e.i., Jim Bradley in middle eastern Galilean garb). But this is all conjecture (worthless at that). But would we be able to recognize Jesus as the Divine Son of God in an empirical way, just by looking at him? Kierkegaard says no! As soon as God becomes incarnate he has to take on a "this-worldly" form so that we would be able to perceive him. But what we would apprehend would be something limited, something finite. So where's the "God-bit"? Kierkegaard point is that the "God-bit" cannot be perceived directly through the senses. We can perceive things indirectly by our senses, but the Divine in Jesus is never perceived directly. And by its very nature, cannot be perceived directly. So even in revelation the revelation of the Divine remains hidden. But revelation always involves a double action, a veiling and an unveiling. In order to unveil himself, God has to veil himself in human form (and by extension this principle can be applied to the Bible). Where's the Divine? It's basic to Kierkegaard that the Divine comes to us in another form, in other words,

Incognito. Revelation, especially the Incarnation, involves what Kierkegaard calls the Absolute Paradox. This Incognito is impenetrable. The New Testament doesn't indicate that there was any neon light saying "Here He is!" There is a kind of hiddenness with God, all the time he is revealed.

Events such as the Transfiguration (seeing the Risen Christ, etc.) show a partial lifting of the veil but Jesus is still seen as a Human and it was before a very limited audience. Two things that need to be remembered in connection with this is that it was to those with a special relationship to Christ and we don't have direct access to the event. All we have is the testimony of those that were there. This is a sort of side issue for Kierkegaard, but is an important apologetic for Evangelicals today. The issue is do we believe in the Scriptures because of the miracles (eg., the Transfiguration, etc.) that is contained in scripture or do we believe in the veracity of these accounts because this is the inspired Word of God? If we say the latter then we are accepting the veracity of the history on the basis of Faith. It's Brown's contention that many of those that react strongly against Kierkegaard are Kierkegaardian themselves without knowing it themselves. They all come back to a faith position.

In the Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard addresses the question of whether one can prove the existence of God. Is it Rational? Can we prove the existence of God through some sort of objective argument? Kierkegaard says No. He says that these attempts at proving God's existence actually develop a "Content of Conception." [See, p. 49].

The works of God are such that only God can perform the works of God. But where are the works of God? The works by which I would deduce his existence are not directly and immediately given.

If one were to use the Telioogical argument, that God exists because of design Kierkegaard asks what one is doing in doing this. A hyposthesis is being devised to explain the phenomenon in the world. This is an ideal, or abstract explanation (a logical statement). It doesn't dispose of all possible objections or alternatives.

I have merely developed the ideality that I have already presupposed. And because of my confidence in this I may be so bold as to defy all objections. Even those that have not been made. In beginning my proof I presuppose the ideal interpretation and also that I will be successful in carrying it through. But else is this but to presuppose that the God exists so I really begin in virtue of confidence in Him. [See, Philosophical Fragments, pp 53-54].

Kierkegaard is saying that the proofs of the Existence of

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God are a form of Presuppositionalism, that it makes sense to explain evidence of cause and effect in the world by reason of a presupposed faith in the Existence of God. We are approaching the existence of God presupposing that Christianity is true. It enables me to make sense of the world.

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I. GENERAL OVERVIEW

B. Kierkegaard's Approach

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Arguments for the Existence of God

Brown quotes Philosophical Fragments [pp 53-54] which is on page 10 of these notes. The quote involves trying to prove the wisdom of God in Nature. We are talking about the Telological Argument, that everything has a purpose. We can see in Nature evidences of purpose and therefore we argue back, from evidences of purpose, to a Great Designer, whom we call God. Kant called the Telological Argument the most impressive of all the arguments and yet he ultimately rejected it. What is Kierkegaard saying about this? He's saying that all arguments take on some form of an abstraction. That is we look at something, and when we look at it we abstract what we believe to be the purpose of the thing. This is what he's talking about when he refers to the "Ideal interpretation," what is the idea of the thing, the purpose. We're taking a thing, such as cows and guessing (abstracting) what the purpose of such a thing could be ("to provide milk") and reading that back into the reality of the object (even though our "proposed purpose" may or may not have any real connection to the object, much less be its purpose for being).

This is relatively "simple" when applied to cows but how is this applied to cancer cells, or mosquitoes, or planets, etc.? What's their purpose? What people are doing when they argue this way is they're running with a hypothesis, an idea of the interpretation. But we started this whole operation on the basis of Faith. You believe in God, you have a deep down awareness or belief in God. But believing God is a presupposition and therefore these arguments are devised to support a position that you have taken already on the basis of faith. And in your faith in the argument you believe that you will be able to defy all objections and all possible objections, even things which you have no knowledge of. Essentially this is a Faith position [understatement of the quarter!]. You are presupposing the existence of God on the basis of faith, and it is an argument for faith. But the real reason that you believe is something deeper than the argument, because you believed in God already. The rational argument is only an attempt to justify that position (in a partial and limited and abstracted way). When one talks in this fashion one encounters what some [eg., Francis Scheaffer] would call Kierkegaard's irrationalism and subjectivism.

Francis Scheaffer has written a book called Escape from Reason and numerous other books where he sets himself up as a Presuppositionalist and a Rationalist. Brown feels that Scheaffer's position is not radically different from Kierkegaard, especially Scheaffer's "Step in the Dark"

[compared to Kierkegaard's "Leap of Faith"]. There's a curious confusion of thought in the way that Scheaffer used to attack Kierkegaard as one of the "Absolute Baddies" [Brown's term].

Underlying the entire approach is Kierkegaard's conviction that God is a different type of being who exists in his own way (or her own way . . .). And this is part of the problem, that is, we are limited to thinking in terms of time and space, things that have dimensions. So we have the problem of finitude perceiving infinitude. For Kierkegaard there is a double difference between us and God. We are finite and God is Other and he exists in his own way (which is an appropriate way for God to exist), therefore there is a metaphysical difference between us and God. The second difference is a moral difference between us and God. This is because we are all sinners, we perform evil acts and have evil thoughts, and God is pure. Inevitably there is this gulf between us and God. This means that God cannot be understood Rationally, because we are limited to think rationally about objects that exist within time and space. But because God is beyond, therefore God cannot be proved Rationally.

QUESTION: Just because God is different how does he [Kierkegaard] assume that God is going to be A-rational?

Because everything which belongs to time and space is finite and limited. And one can go through all of the objects in time and space [if one had the time] and one would find that they're all finite and that they are just not God. But Kierkegaard has a deep down apprehension about a Being who is different. As a matter of fact all finite beings turn out to not be God. Therefore God and Human Rationality must belong to different categories.

QUESTION: What about Analogies?

Analogies draw attention to a likeness between us and God, and there's a kind of point of correspondence and yet in the end the reality of God is greater than any analogy that we can use. He is different. This is a question raised by Kierkegaard. That is, can we speak meaningfully at all about God?

QUESTION: Is he saying that one cannot prove God rationally, therefore you cannot think about him rationally or theologically?

What he says in the Philosophical Fragments is that Reason has its own paradoxical passion which desires its own downfall.

But how shall the Reason be able to understand one absolutely different from itself? If this is not immediately evident it will become clear in the light of consequences. For if the God is absolutely unlike men then man is absolutely unlike God. But how could the Reason be expected

to understand this? Where we seem to be confronted with a paradox. Merely to maintain the knowledge that the God is unlike you, man needs the help of God. And now we know that God is absolutely different from them. And if the God and the man are absolutely different this cannot be accounted for on the basis of what man derives from the God. For in that we are akin. Their unlikeness must never be explained by what man derives from himself, by what he has brought upon his own head, and what can we say had this be? What can it be but sin. Since the unlikeness, the absolute unlikeness is something that we have brought upon ourself. [See, Philosophical Fragments, pp 57-58].

Kierkegaard also believes in Revelation. But what is revealed in Revelation? That God is unlike us. And we need revelation to have this. We can recognize that the finite things are not God, then in Revelation one finds that God is unlike us.

The content of Revelation is paradoxical for Kierkegaard in that we have to talk about God in revelation using language that applies to this world. But the reality of God is a transcendent metaphysically morally different reality. In Revelation, and the central point of revelation, is the incarnation in which we have the Kierkegaard's Absolute Paradox, the Divine Incognito. Kierkegaard is saying that it is impossible for human beings to encounter God directly. The knowledge of God has to be transformed into something that we can appreciate. But in the process of transforming this information there is a definite change so that it is change to something different than itself. It is a moment of veiling in unveiling and unveiling in veiling [See, Philosophical Fragments, p. 59].

Kierkegaard addresses the question, is Faith a form of Knowledge? He says, No.

Faith is not a form of knowledge. No one can have as an object the observative that the eternal is at the starting point. But his disciple is in faith so related to his teacher as to be eternally concerned with his disciple's existence. [See, Philosophical Fragments, p 76].

What are the truth conditions when we say that we know something?

(1) There has to be some fact corresponding to what we claim to know.

(2) One has to show that this is not just a lucky guess [there is a difference between knowing and guessing].

(3) It is a self contradiction to claim to know something that is untrue or self contradictory. Example: I know for a fact that Ferraro is vice-president of the United States of America. This would not be knowledge because it

would be an untrue claim.

Kierkegaard says supposing you claim to know something that is irrational, or beyond reason, can you claim to know it? He says no. The point is the incarnation. From a logical point of view the incarnation is inconceivable. That is, it is inconceivable that God should be a human being. From a strictly logical point of view the incarnation is absurd. It seems illogical and absurd because it is beyond the scope of reason. One cannot say how God can be a human being and God at the same time. This is where Kierkegaard is written off as an irrationalist. But in this same way that Kierkegaard is regarded as an irrationalist, those that pose themselves as orthodox (eg., Scheaffer, etc.) tend to lean on the same faith position. [Brown is using a principle of verification that is a terminology that was used after Kierkegaard, but Brown feels is Kierkegaardian in nature].

To want to change the Beloved is not really an act of love. Many go into marriage with the idea that "this person really isn't too bad," but in the back of their minds they intend on making some changes in him/her as time goes on. Kierkegaard is saying that if God had that attitude in loving us, then it wouldn't be true love. But how can God, the King, communicate to the Maiden? Only by changing himself, which is the ultimate act of love. God leaves behind his glory in the incarnation, becomes a human being in order to identify himself with us, to be on the same level with us. In so doing, God is really and truly a human being. So what we have is the Absolute Paradox, the Divine Incognito.

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C. Kierkegaard's Approach to Christ and Christianity

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His View of History: Background

By the time Kierkegaard had begun his writings, the 1840's the "Quest for the Historical Jesus" [a term later popularized by Schweitzer] was well on the way. The essential question was, is the New Testament historically reliable? Kierkegaard is asking, "What is the point of it all? Is accurate historical knowledge adequate for faith?" His answer is no.

Kierkegaard draws a distinction between time and eternity. We live on the level of time and God lives on the level, for the lack of a better term, of eternity. Eternity is not simply endless time. Kierkegaard writes about "someone being a contemporary," which means someone who lives at the same time as another. But for Kierkegaard you can be a contemporary on two levels, on the level of time and on the level of the eternal [See, Philosophical Fragments, pp 83-84]. The important thing is to be a contemporary on the level of the eternal [i.e., to be "known eternally"].

Kierkegaard is saying that living at the time of Christ is not enough, living with the grasp of sense perception is

not enough. Being a contemporary, a true contemporary, is "Knowing God." The credibility of the facts is not the central issue. Kierkegaard asks how do the facts relate to the Eternal/Trancendent/Divine? [See, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp 130-131]:

What is historical fact? The historical fact which can become an object only for faith of which no human being cannot communicate to another, that is, which indeed can be communicated to another but not so that the other believes it and which if communicated in the former thing is certain is so communicated as to prevent the other, so far as possible, from accepting it immediately. If the facts spoken of were simple historical facts the accuracy of the historical sources would be of grave importance, yet this is not the case. For faith cannot be discovered by merely the nicest accuracy of the eternal. The historical fact that the God has been in human form is the essence of the matter. The rest of the detail is not even as important as if we had to do with a human being instead of with the God. If the contemporary generation had left behind nothing but these words, "We believe that in such and such a year, that God appeared among us in the form of a humble servant, that he lived and taught in our community, and finally died." It would be more than enough. The contemporary generation would have done all that was necessary. And this little advertisement, this letter burning on the page of universal human history would be sufficient to afford an occasion for a successor and the most voluminous account can, in all eternity, be nothing more. If we wish to express the relations subsistent between a contemporary and his successor, in the briefest possible context without sacrificing accuracy for brevity we may say, the successor believed by means of this expresses the means of the culture, the testimony of the contemporaries, and in virtue of the condition he himself received from God. There is no disciple who is second hand, the first and the last are essentially on the same plane. Only the related generation finds it secure in the testimony of a contemporary generation while the contemporary generation on this occasion remits to its own immediate contemporaneity, and in so far is nothing than any other generation.

This is no doubt one of the most often quoted pieces from Kierkegaard, according to Brown. On the face of it Kierkegaard seems to be advocating a pretty thorough going Historical Skepticism (as complete as his German

contemporary, D.F. Strauss, or the 20th century scholar, R. Bultmann). He seems to be saying that it doesn't matter if the historical records are correct or not. All that matters is belief and how we respond. It seems that if you take the passage out of context that he is advocating a kind of "Wizard of Oz" approach to truth. That is the wizard was a hoax but along the way the characters acquire the objectives that they had set out for. It's the process that is important and not necessarily the content. Belief over content. Existence before essence (that means you live first and that determines the kind of being that you are). Is this what Kierkegaard is saying? --- If none of the records were correct, if the bible was incorrect and all the rest of it, that our attitude in the face of a minimal tradition, minimal kerygma that we believe would be enough. Brown feels that this would be a wrong interpretation of Kierkegaard. It would be taken out of context, though it does lend itself to that interpretation. It does this for several reasons. For one thing looking at Kierkegaard's writings as a whole he seems to take the Bible as established fact, at its face. No where in his writings does Kierkegaard pursue any modern critical study of the Bible in order to dispute the historicity. In view of many of his contemporaries Brown feels that Kierkegaard is ultra-conservative. Having said that, the problem for Kierkegaard is how the temporal relates to the eternal? How does what happened in time affect us now? But the Bible essentially consists of the written testimony of the witnesses. How does that effect us? It's not an objective package which we can buy and grasp. Because if it is then we shall miss the transcendent. The whole point is that we believe by means of the testimony of the Bible "in virtue of the condition that we receive from God" (grace). So what he is trying to develop is the what is involved in the logic of the reading. Brown sees this position as being faithfully orthodox.

Kierkegaard's Subjectivity

Kierkegaard says in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript that Objective truth is worthless, and what counts is subjectivity. But what do we mean by subjectivity? The key to understanding Kierkegaard is that God encounters us as a subject and never ever an object. God is always a subject. This is because objectivity belongs to time and space. [See, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p 178]:

The existing individual who chooses to pursue the objective way and ended upon the entire approximation process by which it is proposed to bring God to light objectively. But this is in all eternity impossible, because God is a subject and therefore exists only for subjectivity in inwardness.

But God can never be converted from a subject to an object.

And to speak of an objective knowledge of God is in a sense a contradiction of terms. One can have an objective knowledge of the scriptures, a knowledge that can be publicly tested. But there is no way of testing our knowledge of God. One can only observe our overt behavior. We must have a one-on-one relation to God as subject to subject. And the objectivity of scripture is the occasion for encountering God as the eternal Subject.

The other side of the coin is that objectivity is idolatry. In Training in Christianity Kierkegaard writes:

They make Christ a speculative unity of God and man. Or they throw Christ away and take his teaching. Or for sheer seriousness they make Christ a false God. Spirit is negation of direct immediacy. If Christ is very God he must also be unrecognizable. He must assume unrecognizableness, which is a negation of all directness. Direct recognizability is precisely altruistic of a pagan god. [See, p 135].

If God were to objectify himself he would turn himself into an object of time and space. Other religions do that.

QUESTION: If Spirit is negation of directness and man is spirit, then man himself somehow by means as this quality of somehow different than objectivity . . .

Yes, we are subjects. Now this passage from Kierkegaard is a bit complicated. Brown thinks that he is playing on the Hegelian analogy. That is, that God is Spirit, and the ways of Spirit, etc. The point being that the Hegelian thought, the transcendent Spirit of God, the Divine Spirit becomes imminent in the world and objectifies itself in the world. Whereas Kierkegaard is saying that God remains always transcendent, even in his revelation. He is always Other. When Jesus says, "He who has seen me has seen the Father," [John 14] this would be a case in point. That is, what you can see physically with your eyes is the body of Jesus and his actions, his overt behavior. But the Father in him, the actions of the Father, are to be discerned by faith. And this can never be reduced to some sort of objective argument or objective evidence.

QUESTION: What would heaven be for Kierkegaard? Would it heaven be a transcendence or entering into an objective relationship to God?

It would be getting beyond this world of time and space.

QUESTION: Could we then in turn enter into an objective relationship to God?

Kierkegaard would say we would enter into a real relationship, but because objectivity belongs to time and space, it would be inappropriate to use that type of terminology. One might say in view of this that the

doctrine of the Millenium is a form of Idolatry, because its wanting to convert the Eschaton into a this world reality. Objective is not synonym for real, whereas it is for many Evangelicals and Evangelical traditions.

Brown cites a passage from the Journals [See, Journals and Papers, 73-75, vol 1, pp 27-29] entitled: "Dialectic Oriented To Becoming A Christian":

Socrates did not first of all try to collect some proofs for the immortality of the soul in order then to win (?). Believing by virtue of the proofs. Just the opposite. He said the possibility of immortality occupies me to the point that I unconditionally venture to wager my whole life unconditionally upon it. As if it were the surest thing. And this is the way he lived. And his life is a proof of the immortality of the soul. He did not first of all believe by virtue of the proofs, and then live. No, his life is the proof. And not until his martyr death is the proof complete. You see, this is Spirit. This is a little embarrassing for mimics and all those who would second-hand and turn hand round (?), those who are result hunters and those with cowardly effeminent natures. Use with discrimination this may be applied to becoming a Christian.

First of all, comes quite properly Lessing's doubt that one cannot base eternal happiness on something historical. But here is something historical, the story of Jesus Christ. But is it historically entirely certain? The answer then must be that even if it were the surest thing in our history this does not help. No direct transition from the historical can be made as the basis for an eternal happiness. This is something qualitatively new. What then do we do? Here is something historical which teaches me that for my eternal happiness I must turn to Jesus Christ. I must beware of taking a wrong turn into scientific rummaging and recanoietry to see if it is historically certain. For it is sure historically. That is, if it were ten times as certain, even to the minutest detail, it would not help me. For I can not be helped directly. Then I say to myself, I choose. The historical here means so much to me that I resolve to venture my whole life on this thing. And I here resolve. He who lives purely by this thought alone, venturing his life for it, and his life is a proof that he believes. He did not have a pure proof and thereupon to believe and in that life. No, just the opposite. This is called venturing. And without venturing faith is an impossibility. Relating ones self to Spirit means to be up for

examination. To believe, to will to believe, means to change ones life, to be up for examination. The greater examination is the tension of faith. You look at Christians about you, they are coward, effeminent, unspiritual nature, they live in the world but do not grasp it. They do not want to grasp it. They actually think that in all their love of someone will stick his neck out and then they pat themselves for it, and make assurances. But they don't doubt an offense. But with regard of becoming a Christian there is a dialectical difference from Socrates that must be remembered. Specifically, in relationship to immortality the person who relates himself will himself and to the idea.

But when a man chooses upon if to believe in Christ, that is, chooses to wager his life upon that, then he has commissioned to reconciled himself directly to Christ in prayer. Thus the historical is the occasion and so also the object of faith. With all unspiritual nature still in the crowd, they say to wager everything upon an If is a kind of skepticism. It is fanciful, not prosperous. It is because they will not venture. And this is the unspiritual crowd which Christianity has taken intoe, and which has finally done away with Christianity.

Without an element of venture you can't start, you can't make contact with God. Kierkegaard says that there is a parallel between becoming a Christian and what Socrates did (in wagering his life on the belief of the immortality of the soul; i.e., living as if . . .). But there is also a difference. The parallel is that there is an element of decision making in all Truth, as in Pascal's wager. Other point out that in all discovery there is an element of venture (eg., Columbus risking all to find a passages to India). Kierkegaard says that you can't get rid of this element, and to try to get rid of this element of venture and reduce it to objective certainties is to lose Christianity entirely. The difference between Christianity and Socrates, though, is that one can turn to Christ in prayer now and have a relationship with Christ now, which one cannot apply in other forms of Venture.

Kierkegaard's Divine Incognito and Imitatio Christi

When writers talk about being imitators of Christ they are talking about following Christ's footsteps, modeling ones life on Christ, being conformed to his Image. This, according to Brown, is a major theme in Kierkegaard. It underlies why he broke up the engagement, why he got called to Christian service but not to ordination, why he wrote as he did, why finally he attacked the Church---because it wasn't being conformed to Christ. Brown feels that the imitation of Christ and the Divine Incognito belong

together.

To believe, is to believe in the divine and human together in Christ. To comprehend it, is to comprehend his life humanly. But to comprehend it humanly is so far from even more than believing that it has no place beside. It means to lose him. [See, Has A Man The Right To Let Himself Be Put To Death For The Truth].

Kierkegaard feels that the Imitation of Christ is a kind of daily Knosis (a theory popularized by P. Sponheim). [See, Philosophical Fragments, pp 39-40]. In the Incarnation one doesn't see all of the attribute of God (a la Divine Incognito), but one does see a model for Christian life, that is a life of self-giving. This is the way of God (Christ). Kierkegaard asks, "What does it mean to be a Christian?" It means imitation. And the point of similarity is to live a life of self-giving. The point of dissimilarity is that this is not that same as saying that self-denial is a way of salvation. [See, Journals and Papers, 697, vol 1, p 324]. Christ is not a prototype that I should resemble him. I need his help, his grace, but I can't actually resemble him. [See, Christian Discourses, p 308].

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I. GENERAL OVERVIEW

D. Conclusion of Study of Soren Kierkegaard

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[Useful for guidelines in personal reading of Kierkegaard]:

1. Brown's conviction: Kierkegaard is orthodox at heart (that is his approach and beliefs). He was orthodox in his appreciation of Christology (fully God and fully human). His arguments differed from the traditional categories, that is, Scriptural proofs, he doesn't use the language of council of Calcedon, etc.
2. Kierkegaard's position can be compared with that of Anselm (or with Augustine): credo ut intelligium ("I believe that I may understand"). At the time, however, it was vogue to prove beliefs, so in that sense Kierkegaard was somewhat backwards in relation to his time. He philosophized from the stance of Faith.
3. Kierkegaard was a theologian of experience (he was a theologian---> seminary trained . . .). He starts his analysis with experience, but not necessarily like Schliermacher. Schliermacher starts with experience and restates Christianity to fit the environment or his perception of that environment. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, reflects on the experience, but it is not a tool to recreate Christianity. Nonetheless, experience is very important (though not wholly central).
4. Kierkegaard is a precursor of Wittgenstein in his approach. Wittgenstein [See, Philosophical Investigations] says that "it leaves everything as it is." It is not its function to change or restructure Reality but to reflect it. "The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose." Kierkegaard is reminding us of the transcendent God. He starts and stops with Ethics.
5. Kierkegaard was a student of Scripture. He was a student of theology, he was familiar with the standard commentaries and the current hermeneutics. In this sense Kierkegaard was pre-Critical and took a face value reading of Scripture. He was, however, not committed to the view of Scripture as a series of propositional statements to be strung together to form a coherent system of explaining Reality. For Kierkegaard Scripture was a means of revelation.
6. The Supernatural and God in History. Kierkegaard was close to liberal critical scholars in eliminating god from history on a superficial reading of his writings. Current at the time was Strauss's Life of Jesus in which the gospels were described as employing mythological language, which was their way of communicating God acting in History (following

the leading of Hegelian philosophy). It was a Pious belief (i.e., of the uneducated masses) to believe in miracles. It didn't properly account for Reality. Kierkegaard can't see God in History (pure Cause and Effect) but he did not follow Strauss either. It was a matter of the Divine Incognito. That is, the direct perception is human but the divine is there and cannot be perceived empirically.

7. Kierkegaard and Kant. Kierkegaard follows in the tradition of Kant. He is a transcendent Kantian. It is foundational in Kant to understand that humans are limited to talking meaningfully about objects in time and space. The mind is limited to the physical world of time and space and not equipped for meta-physics. Kierkegaard accepted this position. Kant felt because of humans inability to meaningfully discuss God that God should not be brought into it at all. Kierkegaard accepted the Reality of God but simultaneously acknowledged that the mind is not equipped to understand it.
8. Kierkegaard portrait of Christ. Kierkegaard appears to fall into two categories regarding this subject A) a Nestorian Christ, and B) A Teacher without a Subject Matter.

A) Nestorius argued regarding Christ an asserted reality of the Divine Nature and Human Nature in Christ but he was unclear about what the relationship between the two Natures was. Therefore he was accused of advocating that there was possibly two Sons of God in one body. To a point Kierkegaard's view is that Christ was fully Divine and fully Human but he never goes into how they are related.

B) Teacher without a Subject Matter. In the Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard seems to present Christ as a teacher but Christ doesn't seem to be teaching any objective subject matter. Kierkegaard doesn't see it as being a matter of present a "Facts package." Christ employs the Maieutic method to open eyes [See, John 14]. Christ teaches a reality that can't be objectified. It provides an occasion to encounter God (which in turn does use an objective language---> Christ's parables).

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II. SURVEY OF PHILOSOPHIC BACKGROUND TO SOREN KIERKEGAARD

A. G.E. Lessing (1729-1781)

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Lessing is important for two reasons. He is important in understanding Kierkegaard and he is also important in himself.

He was the most important German writer in the 18th century of German literature and plays. The pre-Lessing plays followed the Classical lines of the Greek and French plays. Lessing wrote "middle-class" plays that reflected the lives of the middle-class. He started out as a student

of theology. His father and grandfather were both pastors. Lessing maintained an interest in theology throughout his life. [See, H. Chadwick, Lessing: Theological Writings]. Kierkegaard addresses Lessing's thoughts in many of his writings.

Lessing and Theology. In Hamburg during the 1760's he was a critic for the Hamburg National Theater. During this time he met the family of H.S. Reimarus and Moses Mendelssohn (a leader of the Jewish Renaissance). Reimarus (a Deist) wrote Apology of Rational Worshippers of God (which wasn't published in its entirety until 1972). Reimarus never intended it for publication because of the danger. When Lessing became in charge of the Wottenbuttel library he began to publish excerpts from the Apology as the remaining fragments of an unnamed author (this series climaxed in 1778). The fragments tried to explain the intentions of Jesus. Jesus, according to the fragments was a well meaning misguided reformer that preached about a coming Kingdom of God. Jesus got so caught up in his own teaching that he attempted to force God's hand by staging the Triumphant Entry, etc. In the course of this he is killed and the Apostles are left to continue his ministry. The result is that Christianity is largely false, though the original intention of Jesus was commendable.

Lessing was simply the editor that was responsible for the Wottenbuttel Fragments (which a curious parallel to Kierkegaard's Philosophic Fragments supposedly written by Johannes Climacus). Lessing then engaged himself in a pamphlet war with various pastors, among them J.M. Goeze. Lessing took Voltaire's stance that he didn't necessarily agree with the Fragments but with the right to say so.

What was up for grabs? The historical foundations of Christianity was up for grabs. How do you know that Christianity is true? The traditional categories of Prophecy and History were challenged ---> Jesus' miracles (God works of the supernatural) in History and fulfilled prophecy in Jesus' Life. Lessing's Fragments asserted that Jesus didn't really do the miracles attributed to him and that the Christian interpretation of Old Testament prophecy is strained. Contemporaries looked from Jesus' teaching to his supposed miracles to his Incarnation. At that point (the Incarnation) the other miracles would be easy to take. Lessing wrote that it took the Bible and excess to support religion, that inward truth is real religion and the religion is inward truth. Above all, Existentialism is religious truth (because it works) and the facts are unimportant. His main contention was "accidental truth of history can never become the proof of the necessary truth of reason." [See, Against Pastor Sumann, p 53]. He wasn't saying something that was radically new. He was just drawing distinctions between logical statements and factual/historical statements (Liebnitz's Two Truths).

ACCIDENTAL HISTORICAL TRUTH AND LOGICAL TRUTH

↓ V	↓ V
contingent truth	necessary (one position)
happens to be true	tautology- predicate contained
↓	within the subject: "A rainy
V	day is a wet day" ("wet"
Empirical experiment to	within the meaning of
verify the assertion.	"rainy").

Lessing was implying that there was more to it than contingent truth (history) to verify Christianity. Religion must be founded on Truths of Reason (which in Christianity was found in the commandment of love). Lessing wants more than historical certainty. [See, Wottenbuttel Fragments, pp 54, 55]. The usual model of Apologetic was:

Miracles --> Jesus --> Scripture --> Writers --> History.

Lessing was then forbidden from publishing, so he went back to the theater and wrote Nathan the Wise. A synopsis of the story involves a father with three sons and one ring to pass onto the sons. To solve any potential troubles the father has two duplicate rings made and at his death leaves instruction to give the three rings to the sons, who take the rings to a judge (Nathan the Wise) to tell them which one is the right ring. But it is something that cannot be judicated and he instructs the sons to live as if the one ring that they possess is the true ring. The moral is that truth is self-evidencing and that what is important to all historical religions is that they teach eternal truths. It follows William James' saying that "Religious truth befits the beholder."

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B. I. Kant (1724-1804)

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1. Kant's greatest single work was the Critique of Pure Reason. The 18th century was the age of Enlightenment which was the age of Criticism. It was a release from bondage of doing or believing simply because it was the word handed down by the Church or the State. The motto was "Dare to be wise." There was a spirit of free and open examination even of Religion.
2. The distinction between Synthetic and the Analytic judgement [See, Introduction to Critique of Pure Reason, p 48]. An example of Analytical judgement would be: A is a subset of (or within) B. Synthetic judgement would be: A can relate to B. This is important to Kant and Kierkegaard and ignored by Hegelianism. Hegelianism treats reality as a form of logic and therefore a key to reality (ignoring the difference between true statement and statement that reflect a present/temporal condition in the Real world).

In testing truth the first step is to determine what kind of statement it is. If it is an Analytical statement

then it is subjected to a test of logic (no corresponding truth). If it is a Synthetic statement then it is subjected to a verification test.

3. This distinction underlies Kant's Critique of the Existence of God. He tries the validity of the Ontological argument: "Being that there which no greater can be thought." Kant's Critique points out that the argument is Analytical and Tautological in nature with which there is no verification in Reality; the first statement is true in its own system but it must be verified to be declared true in Reality.
4. Kant's view of God. The human mind is severely limited which operates via a form of intuition (time and space) and categories of understanding (number, quality, quantity). Brown illustrates this principle by citing a black & white TV analogy: the TV station broadcasts in color but our TV's only can translate black and white images. Our minds are, in a sense, superimposing a form of reality. That is, we cannot know something within itself, as it is within itself. Humans are ill-suited for meta-physics, even everyday Reality. The notion of God is a regulative idea. We can't add to our stock of knowledge [See, Critique of Pure Reason, pp 566-567]. We presuppose "a something" - postulate pure practical reason.

Kierkegaard is aware of Kant's embargo of speculative metaphysics. God remains a mystery which is present and hidden.

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II. SURVEY OF PHILOSOPHIC BACKGROUND TO SOREN KIERKEGAARD
C. Idealism

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Definition

Idealism is a very illusive and elastic term. Kant was a sort of Idealist who came at the climax of the Age of Enlightenment. [See, Brown, Jesus and European Protestant Thought, pp 57-58].

E. Troeltsch

Troeltsch wanted to get beyond the Age of Enlightenment. He saw in the Enlightenment that reason tended toward being highly individualistic in nature.

Idealism was to take into account feelings as well as reason. It sees different aspects of Reality as a kind of whole. Nature is the expression of the Spirit (to use the Hegelian notion).

H.A. Korff

Idealism supersedes Christianity and Enlightenment. It draws from both and therefore preserves them and rejects them.

Conclusion

1. Idealism is trying to get beyond Christianity and the Enlightenment.
2. It wants to remove the transcendent view of God, the God out there. It holds to a Philosophy of Being, which as Being itself has its own dynamic. Paul Tillich or Process Theology can be traced back (along with Hegel's/Idealism's Pantheism) to Spinoza's Pantheism.

Excursis: Tillich's 2 Kinds of Reason:

1) Technical reason, i.e., $2 + 2 = 4$, deduction, critical reason.

2) Ontological reason, i.e., Reason (with a capital "R"), Logos (of St. John and the Stoics), the Divine Reason that permeates everything. This roughly corresponds to scientific laws, the "why's", reasonability. The structure of the world is fundamentally Rational--- it has an underlying rationality.

The differences between Tillich's Pantheism and that of the Spinoza is that Tillich recognizes a gap between essence and existence. The essence expresses the ideal (with flaws). The problem is that Reality isn't rational because in view of rationality Evil would be absurd (leading some to take the position that the Creation and the Fall must co-exist).

Spinoza's Pantheism is presented as a complete Rational system, whereas Idealism presents a dynamic never complete, ever-evolving system. This is based on the idea that Reality is never static. The idea of Being involves negation isolation of the Idea. Kierkegaard's objection, particularly to Hegel, is that if you don't have a complete system, you don't have a system at all.

Excursus: Goethe

"Being manifests itself through beings." "Worshipping the symbolic significant of the particular appreciates the whole." Nothing is more illogical than perfect logic produces. Goethe was much more of an empiricist.

D. Hegel

*** Kierkegaard's arch-enemy ***

He saw the aesthetic as an expression of the Divine. Kierkegaard saw this as a confusion of categories (the Aesthetic and the Divine). These ideas are somewhat tied to Hegel's fortunes.

Hegel's Ideas: An Overview:

1. Hegel rejected Kant [See, Jesus in European Protestant Thought, p 92]. In his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences he wrote of Kant that he was responsible for a Philosophy of Subjectivity---> Subject Idealism. For Hegel true philosophy was meant to deal with the Absolute Subject, that is, God. Hegel sees Kant as limited as with all the Empiricist's because they dealt only with the Finite (which they said was the limits of what could be known, anything else being subjective). Brown noted that something could be both finite and untrue.
2. The Idea. It is true in a far itself. Absolute unity of the concept and objectivity it's the ideal concept. What is Reality? The manifestation of an Idea. He is employing some of the images of Plato's Forms & Ideas. The difference was that Plato seemed to allude that the object was to break through this realm to the plane of the Forms, but with Hegel we are heading in the opposite direction and experiencing the Divine in this plane through the Aesthetic. [See, Jesus in European Protestant Thought, p 92].
3. Spirit. [See, Phenomenology of Spirit, A.V. Miller, ed., p 14]. The German word for Spirit is Geist which has two fundamental meanings for Hegel. The first meaning for Geist for Hegel is "Spirituality of Spirit." The second meaning is "mind," the rational character. Regarding Truth, Hegel saw that it was not a static affair, but always developing. Ideas become concrete when science recognizes this for what they are.

4. History. The history of the world is the history of the Spirit coming to consciousness . . . [meaningful stuff, huh.]
5. Religion. Hegel didn't write much on Religion directly. What we do have is from lecture notes. God and Revelation [See, Christian Religion, pp 2ff] distinguished from Self and the object of Self, that is the Spirit. In Hegel's early theological writings he wrote that Religion was the self-objectifying of God. There was a distinction between Images/Picture and concepts [thanks, Hegel, for pointing that out!] In his theological studying he saw Images and Concepts differing. Hegel essentially followed Strauss' leading about the unhistorical nature of the Gospel. They were a case of early Christianity's Myth-making tendency. Jesus was one better than the Old Testament prophets. It is a sincere but not real account [See, Jesus in European Protestant Thought, pp 195ff]. What we have is a series of pictures expressing images. Christianity talk about Jesus' Incarnation but self realizing is for everything. [huh?]

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III. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD

A. Either/Or

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Introduction/Background

A little of Kierkegaard's personal background (a chronology):

September 8, 1840	Kierkegaard proposes to Regine Olsen.
November 1840	Kierkegaard enters Seminary.
August 11, 1841	Kierkegaard returns the ring.
October 1841	The engagement is formally over.
October 25, 1841	Kierkegaard goes to Berlin and attends Schelling lectures. He becomes disillusioned with Idealism, begins writing <u>Either/Or</u> (the <u>Or</u> part first).
March 6, 1842	Kierkegaard returns to Copenhagen.
February 20, 1843	<u>Either/Or</u> is published.

[See, Journals and Papers, 6472, vol 6, pp 191-201].

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III. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD
A. Either/Or

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Introduction/Background (continued)

1. The Journal Entry. [See, Journals and Papers, 6472, vol 6, pp 191-201; Bretall, pp 14-15 & 16]:

August 24, 1849. Infandum me jubes, Regina, renovare dolorem ("Thou biddest me, Regina, renew the unspeakable grief.")

In August I returned. The period from August 9 till the beginning of September I used in the strict sense to approach her.

On September 8 I left my house with the firm purpose of deciding the matter. We met each other in the street outside their house. She said there was nobody at home. I was fool hardy enough to look upon that as an invitation, just the opportunity I wanted. I went in with her. We stood alone in the living room. She was a little uneasy. I asked her to play me something as she usually did. She did so; but that did not help me. Then suddenly I took the music away and closed it, not without a certain violence, threw it down on the piano and said: "Oh, what do I care about music now! It is you I am searching for, it is you whom I have sought after for two years." She was silent. I did nothing else to make an impression upon her; I even warned her against myself, against my melancholy. When, however, she spoke about Schlegel I said, "Let that relationship be a parenthesis; after all the priority is mine." (N.B. It was only on the 10th that she spoke of Schlegel; on the 8th she did not say a word).

She remained quite silent. At last I left, for I was anxious lest someone should come and find both of us, and she so disturbed. I went immediately to Etatsraad Olsen. I know that I was terribly concerned that I had made too great an impression upon her. I also feared that my visit might lead to a misunderstanding and even hurt her reputation.

Her father said neither yes nor no, but he was willing enough, as I could see. I asked for a meeting: it was granted to me for the afternoon of the 10th. I did not say a single word to persuade her. She said, Yes.

I immediately assumed a relation to the whole family, and turned all my virtuosity upon her

father whom, moreover, I have always loved.

But inwardly, the next day I say that I had made a false step. A penitent such as I was, my vita ante acta, my melancholy, that was enough.

I suffered unspeakably at that time.

She seemed to notice nothing. On the contrary her spirits were so high that once she said she had accepted me out of pity. In short, I have never known such high spirits.

. . . If I had not been a penitent, had not had my vita ante acta, had not been melancholy, my union with her would have made me happier than I had ever dreamed of being. But insofar as I was what, alas, I was, I had to say that I could be happier in my unhappiness without her than with her; she had moved me and I would have liked, more than liked, to have done everything.

But there was a divine protest, that is how I understood it. The wedding. I had to hide such a tremendous amount from her, had to base the whole thing upon something untrue.

He begins the selection with a quote from Virgil - interesting in light of the very personal nature of the writing. This is basically a blow by blow account of their engagement and his reluctance and the "Divine protest." In the "Diary of a Seducer" Kierkegaard puts himself in a bad light to in some way not bring the offense upon God. A similar struggle is portrayed in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling where Kierkegaard places himself in the sandals of Abraham having to confront his son Isaac with this terrible deed (that he was going to have to kill him). [See, J. Gill, Essays on Kierkegaard]. In the Journal and Papers there is an interesting story about a cupboard that Kierkegaard had built. He reflects back to a comment made by Regine toward the end of their engagement that she would be willing to live with him if in no more than a small cupboard. So after it was all over he had a cupboard made, with no shelves (so she would fit) and he kept two copies (one for him and one for her) of his pseudonymous works in that cupboard. This is all worth noting because of the preface in Either/Or where Victor Eremita describes finding the documents that make up Either/Or in a cupboard that he had struck with an ax because the change draw wouldn't open.

In Journals and Papers [pp 611-612] Hanne Mourier records Regine's own account of the affair referred to in the above excerpt. It pretty much follows Kierkegaard's account. In Regine's account Kierkegaard appeared to "display poor listening skill" (to put it clinically) while she seemed to acting natural given the circumstances.

2. Concluding Unscientific Postscript Reference.

Kierkegaard was certainly self absorbed. He paraded before himself in the guise of Johannes Climacus commenting on Either/Or which was "written" by Victor Eremita. He

(whoever "he" was) sees it as a comment on the Asthetic and Ethical in human relationships. It is an indirect attack of speculative philosophy because speculative philosophy doesn't take into account the problems of existing people. It can only be inwardly appropriated and not reduced to an objective maxium.

The problem with this review and that of Either/Or itself (i.e., Victor Eremita's Preface, etc.) is that it runs the risk of becoming boxes within boxes. This is all emphasized by the fact that no conclusion is made regarding the Asthetic way of life or the Ethical way of life.

The first part of Either/Or is a melancholic aesthete worked up by the Ethical. The second part is an ethical individual living by the ethical first [huh?].

The point is that for Hegel truth emerges by a system or the use of systems. But for Kierkegaard truth emerges through movement (because there is no workable system).

3. Point of View Reference. [See, pp 18, 19].

Kierkegaard comments in Point of View that Either/Or was a kind of poetical catharsis. In his mind he felt that after the end of his engagement that he had to choose between living the "wildest sort of life" (the Asthetic) and the life of the cloister (the Ethical). Brown comments that for Kierkegaard it actually turns out to be "Neither/Nor" because neither of these two possibilities are fully satisfying.

Excursis: Hegel on Aesthetics

[See, Aesthetics: Lectures of The Fine Arts, Knox, translator, Oxford Press, 1972]. In the Aesthetics Hegel's views on the nature of Beauty are spelled out. The concept of Beauty is objectified in the object of beauty. [See, pp 110-111]. The concept of Objectivity is the reality of the concept [here we go again!]. Hegel's concept are developments of Plato's Forms and Ideas. Reality corresponds to the Idea. A thing is real only because of the Idea of the thing.

Religion/Asthetic Beauty concept therefore is true in
itself. It is corelative to Truth but
! Truth can be distinguished from Beauty.
v

Particular world

Hegel is moving in the opposite direction from Plato:

Plato Particulars ---> Idea
Hegel Particulars <--- Idea

"An evolving system actualizing themselves in the realm of science, history, beauty embodied in Reality."

Preface to Either/Or

It is explained in the Preface by Victor Eremita the discovery of the documents in the cupboard that had to be hit.¹ For a lack of a better description the two authors are called A and B. The title is somewhat reminiscent of Lessings "Papers." The two different views are given in the course of Either/Or but no conclusion is reached. That is left up to the reader.

The Text: The Diapsalmata

The term "Diapsalmata" comes from the Book of the Psalms in the LXX version. It corresponds to the Hebrew word Selah which is thought to be a musical refrain. Thus, A's Diapsalmata are reflections on life: themes, ideas, odd thoughts, repetitively given.

Reflections on the Aesthetic. A is not answering Hegel's lectures point by point but he is simply reflecting on the good life. A common theme seems to be the hollowness that brings pain and bitter return rather than a sort of Beatific Vision (a la Hegel).

A asks, "What is a poet?" [See, Mackey, Kierkegaard, a Kind of A Poet]. A poet is not a verse writer, something outward. It is the process of the imaginative author putting experience into words. But what kind of experience? Kierkegaard says Pain:

What is a poet? An unhappy man who in his heart harbors a deep anguish, but whose lips are so fashioned that the moans and cries which pass over them are transformed into ravishing music. His fate is like that of the unfortunate victims whom the tyrant Phalaris imprisoned in a brazen bull, and slowly tortured over a steady fire; their cries could not reach the tyrant's ears so as to strike terror into his heart; when they reached his ears they sounded like sweet music. And men crowd about the poet and say to him, "Sing for us soon again"---which is as much as to say, "May new sufferings torment your soul, but may your lips be fashioned as before; for the cries would only distress us, but the music, the music, is delightful." And the critics come forward and say, "That is perfectly done---just as it should be, according to the rules of aesthetics." Now it is understood that a critic resembles a poet to a hair; he only lacks the anguish in his heart and the music upon his lips. I tell you, I would rather be a swineherd, understood by the swine, than a poet misunderstood by men. [See, Either/Or, p 19].

Running comments on various passages of the Diapsalmata²:

--- The greatest moments of pleasure and death are next door neighbors:

There are well-known insects which die in the moment of fecundation. So it is with all joy; life's supreme and richest moment of pleasure is coupled with death. [See, p 20]

--- The essence of joy is not with the thing enjoyed but in the accompanying consciousness:

The essence of pleasure does not lie in the thing enjoyed but in the accompanying consciousness. If I had a humble spirit in my service who, when I asked for a glass of water brought me the world's costliest wines blended in a chalice, I should dismiss him, in order to teach him pleasure consists not in what I enjoy, but in having my own way. [See, p. 30]

One of the dangers is that the Asthetic eventually leads to the pursuing of Art and then to the collecting of Art, which in one sense kills it (the dynamic of living art is stifled by the human tendency to want to possess it). The Asthetic consequently doesn't make one happy.

--- Reflections on melancholy as spinning ones wheels and going nowhere, only digging oneself deeper:

I do not care for anything. I do not care to ride for the exercise is too violent. I do not care to walk, walking is too strenuous. I do not care to lie down, for I should either have to remain lying, and I do not care to do that, or I should have to get up again, and I do not care to do that either. Summa summarum: I do not care at all. [See, p 20]

--- Truth cannot be had in mere propositional statements:

Something wonderful has happened to me. I was caught up into the seventh heaven. There sat all the gods in assembly. By special grace i was granted the privilege of making a wish. "Wilt thou," said Mercury, "have youth or beauty or power or a long life or the most beautiful maiden or any of the other glories we have in the chest? Choose, but only one thing." For a moment I was at a loss. Then I addressed myself to the gods as follows: "Most honorable contemporaries, i choose this one thing, that I may always have the laugh on my side." Not one of the gods said a word; on the contrary, they all began to laugh. From that I concluded that my wish was granted, and found that the gods knew how to express themselves with taste; for it would hardly have

---={ TH531: KIERKEGAARD, Fuller Seminary, Fall '85 }---
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been suitable for them to have answered gravely:
"Thy wish is granted." [See, p 42].

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III. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD

A. Either/Or

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Preliminary class comments:

Kierkegaard ends the Or portion (the last portion) of the book with a prayer and a few scriptures. The title of the section is: the Edification Implied In The Thought As Against god We Are Always In The Wrong. He cites Luke 19:41ff. Brown confessed to the weakness of looking at the last chapter of a book in order to better get a feel for its course. In Either/Or Kierkegaard undercuts both A and B in his conclusion [See, p 356]:

Your thought has now followed the course of this exposition, perhaps hurrying swiftly ahead when it was along familiar paths it led you, slowly and perhaps reluctantly when the way was strange to you. But nevertheless you must admit that the case is as it was set forth, and your thought had no objection to raise against it. Before we separate, one question more, my hearer: Did you wish, could you wish, that the case might be different? Could you wish that you might be in the right? Could you wish that that beautiful law which for thousands of years has supported the race and every generation in the race, that beautiful law, more glorious than the law which supports the stars in their courses upon the vault of heaven, could you wish that this law might burst, with more dreadful effect than if that law of nature were to lose its force and everything were to be resolved into appalling chaos? Could you wish this? I have no word of wrath with which to terrify you; your wish must not proceed from dread of the presumptuous thought of willing to be in the right against God; I ask only, could you wish that it might be otherwise? Perhaps my voice does not possess enough strength and heartiness to penetrate into your inmost thought---O, but ask yourself, ask with the solemn uncertainty with which you would address yourself to a man who was able, you knew, by a single word to decide your happiness in life, ask yourself still more seriously, for verily it is a question of salvation. do not check your soul's fight, do not grieve the better promptings within you, do not dull your spirit with half wishes and half thoughts. Ask yourself, and continue to ask until you find the answer. For one may have know a thing many time and acknowledged it, one may have willed a thing many times and attempted it; and yet it is only by the deep inward movements, only

by the indescribable emotions of the heart, that for the first time you are convinced that what you have known belongs to you, that no power can take it from you; for only the truth which edifies is truth for you. [See, p 356].

Kierkegaard notes that he used to escape to Berlin when faced with a difficulty (eg., after the end of his engagement to Regine). But later he learned to face the music. Chesterton once said that travel narrows the mind. The implication is that one can be so busy "doing" that one never considers "why."

Brown noted the irony of lecturing on Kierkegaard. All one can do is to meditate and reflect on the works. the last thing one could do with Kierkegaard is to set up an objective True/False test or package.

Some More Preliminary Observations:

1. The book as a whole. The chapters appear to be disconnected and fragmented---not novel-like, continuous storyline. It's not a philosophical treatise either. The type of genre (beyond being a category of its own) is closest resembling to a Confession, though not in the classical philosophical form (eg., The Confessions of St. Augustine). The book as a whole is a dialogue.

It is interesting to note that a word derived from the Greek dialogue is dialectic. The underlying idea is that Truth emerges and is not one propositional statement. The form of the book reflects this idea of Truth. If one were to venture a theme it would be "Neither/Nor" because neither the Aesthetic brings us to God nor does the Ethical. The Ethical falls into a category of general rules or principles regarding Marriage, personal commitments, etc; that these are good things. But it doesn't answer one's personal questions about marriage.

2. Subject & Object. For Hegel reality is ultimately one; the forward movement of the Spirit which unites Subject and Object. For Kierkegaard this doesn't help because we are subjects and don't know how to relate to objects. For example in the "Diapsalmata": "The essence of pleasure does not lie in the thing enjoyed but in the accompanying consciousness." [See, p 30]. There is a cleavage between Subject and Object:

What the philosophers say about Reality is often as disappointing as a sign you see in a shop window, which reads: Pressing Done Here. If you brought your clothes to be pressed, you would be fooled; for the sign is only for sale. [See, p 31].

Reality can't be experienced by thought. It must be apprehended as Subject (lived). There is no single Reality.

3. The Rotation Method. It is key to understanding the Either portion of the book on four levels:

1. Amusing essay about people.
2. Critique of the Hegelian system.
3. Critique of Romanticism.
4. An apology to Regine.

4. Irony and the Maieutic Method.

The first volume is very ironic. The intended "message" is different from what is actually said. It demonstrates the purely aesthetic life. It is written from the advocate point of view but leaves the impression of hollowness.

The maieutic method is getting us to see the worthlessness of the Aesthetic life, not by what is said but by our reaction to it.

The Text: The Rotation Method

Why did Bretall put the "Rotation Method" first in his Anthology? To get us into the mind of the first part (Either) of the book right away. It opens with the comic play by Aristophanes' Plutus. It has to do with the god of wealth, Plutus, having gone blind (ironic) discussing his cure. This little dialogue sets the tone of the book (ironic/comical contrast of virtues and material goods). Brown notes that the Oxford Classics Dictionary is most useful for those without a classical background to unpack Kierkegaard's many classical illusions.

The Rotation Method itself opens with the question: What are the principles that govern life? Geist? Not at all. The principle that governs life is that all men are bores!

Starting from a principle is affirmed by people of experience to be a very reasonable procedure; I am willing to humor them, and so begin with the principle that all men are bores. Surely no one will prove himself so great a bore as to contradict me in this. This principle possesses the quality of being in the highest degree repellent, an essential requirement in the case of negative principles, which are in the last analysis the principles of all motion. It is not merely repellent, but infinitely forbidding; and whoever has this principle back of him cannot but receive an infinite impetus forward, to help him make new discoveries. For if my principle is true, one need only consider how ruinous boredom is for humanity, and by properly adjusting the intensity of one's

concentration upon this fundamental truth, attain any desired degree of momentum. Should one wish to attain the maximum momentum, even to the point of almost endangering the driving power, one need only say to oneself: Boredom is the root of all evil. Strange that boredom, in itself so staid and stolid, should have such power to set in motion. The influence it exerts is altogether magical, except that it is not the influence of attraction, but of repulsion.

In the case of children, the ruinous character of boredom is universally acknowledged. Children are always well-behaved as long as they are enjoying themselves. This is true in the strictest sense; for if they sometimes become unruly in their play, it is because they are already beginning to be bored---boredom is already approaching, though from a different direction. In choosing a governess one, therefore, takes into account not only her sobriety, her faithfulness, and her competence, but also her aesthetic qualifications for amusing the children; and there would be no hesitancy in dismissing a governess who was lacking in this respect, even if she had all the other desirable virtues. [See, p 281].

Kierkegaard writes that we pursue the aesthetics to avoid boredom! The entertainment industry is founded upon boredom avoidance (it could be said that Los Angeles exists on the basis of man's desire to avoid Boredom). Kierkegaard employs an illustration involving children, to say that children act up when bored (take that Dr. Dobson!). It is one of the few cases where one finds those that are honest enough (or "innocent" enough) to express their boredom.

But the problem has been with us since the beginning:

The history of this can be traced from the very beginning of the world. The gods were bored, and so they created man. Adam was bored because he was alone, and so Eve was created. Thus boredom entered the world, and increased in proportion to the increase of population. Adam was bored alone; then Adam and Eve were bored together; then Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel were bored en famille; then the population of the world increased, and the peoples were bored en masse. To divert themselves they conceived the idea of construction a tower high enough to reach the heavens. This idea is itself as boring as the tower was high, and constitutes a terrible proof of how boredom gained the upper hand. The nations were scattered over the earth, just as people now travel abroad, but they continued to be bore. Consider the consequences of this

boredom. Humanity fell from its lofty height, first because of Eve, and then from the Tower of Babel. What was it, on the other hand that delayed the fall of Rome, was it not panis and circenses? ("bread and circuses") [See, 282].

Kierkegaard then poses an economic analysis in view of his principle of Boredom. This principle seems to have been "borrowed" from Pascal [See, Pascal's Pensees, Penguin edition, p 66]. Kierkegaard continues to expose (ironically) the hollowness of things. For example, the European courts were designed to divert the attention of the king away from his own boredom. Brown made an illusion to his standing in a grocery store check-out line and glancing at the cover of Omni magazine but seeing the words onui (French for "boredom").

A confesses that the aesthetic can't meet these needs. It's a bottomless pit. He proposes the Rotation Method as a means to counter the bottomless pit. What is the remedy? There are various solutions discussed:

1. WORK:

It is usual to say that idleness is a root of all evil. To prevent this evil one is advised to work. However, it is easy to see, both from nature of the evil that is feared and the remedy proposed, that this entire view is of a every plebeian extraction. idleness is by no means as such a root of evil; on the contrary, it is a truly divine life, provided one is not himself bored. Idleness may indeed cause the loss of one's fortune, and so on, but the high-minded man does not fear such dangers; he fears only boredom. The Olympian gods were not bored, they lived happily in happy idleness. A beautiful woman, who neither sews nor spins nor bakes nor reads nor plays the piano, is happy in her idleness, for she is not bored. So far from idleness being the root of all evil, it is rather the only true good. Boredom is the root of all evil, and it is this which must be kept at a distance. [See, p 285].

The answer to this dilemma is the Rotation Method. You've got to rotate your pleasures. You must rotate or you will lose interest (and become bored).

This is the vulgar and inartistic method, and needs to be supported by illusion. One tires of living in the country, and moves to the city; one tires of one's native land, and travels abroad; one is europamude, and goes to America, and so on; finally one indulges in a sentimental hope of endless journeyings from star to star. [See, p

287]

Paul Tillich commented on the space race during the 1960's that it was just a diversion from the real problems here on earth. Kierkegaard writes that is how people are, they always tire of what and where they are. They easily become victims of a consumer society.

. . . Or the movement is different but still extensive. One tires of porcelain dishes and eats on silver; one tires of silver and turns to gold; one burns half of Rome to get an idea of the burning of Troy. This method defeats itself; it is plain endlessness. And what did Nero gain by it? Antonine was wiser; he says: "It is in your power to review your life, to look at things you saw before, from another point of view." [See, pp 287-288].

Kierkegaard quotes Markus Aurelius as saying that true pleasure, to enjoy true Aesthetic experience, is to enjoy the enjoyment. (No one is going to accuse Kierkegaard of quoting Aurelius to exactly). the best way to handle the problem of Boredom isn't to simply rotate the objects of pleasure or that would lead to boredom itself. One needs to follow Markus Aurelius' lead and learn to take ones enjoyment in enjoyment. This principle is remarkably promoted by the Kodak and Polaroid promotions that to have real enjoyment one must "capture the moments": "The essence of pleasure does not lie in the thing enjoyed but in the accompanying consciousness." [See, p 30]. What the true Aesthete must do is learn to cultivate the enjoyment in the enjoyment from different angles, becoming a sort of "Spiritual enjoyment."

As was learned by the Epicureans et al, one must realize the limitations involved in enjoyment. One must also cultivate remembering and forgetting. One must remember the joy and forget the pain. This is somewhat related to Nietzsche's "Superman", one being able to at will distinguish what will be remembered and what will be discarded. "The whole secret lies in arbitrariness." [See, p 295]. One must program oneself to remember the meal and forget the stomach ache. The point is that one that masters selective memories masters existence. One must beware of the "elsewhere thoughts" that wound from behind. One must avoid relationships that tie oneself down. Friendship make one vulnerable [See, p 291]; This is especially true of marriage. One will not be able to practice and perfect the art of remembering and forgetting:

One must never enter into the relation of marriage. Husband and wife promise to love one another for eternity. This is all very fine, but it does not mean very much; for if their love

comes to an end in time, it will surely be ended in eternity. If, instead of promising forever, the parties would say: until Easter, or until May-day comes, there might be some meaning in what they say; for then they would have said something definite, and also something that they might be able to keep. And how does a marriage usually work out? In a little while one party begins to perceive that there is something wrong, then the other party complains, and cries to heaven: faithless! faithless! A little later the second party reaches the same standpoint, and a neutrality is established in which the mutual faithlessness is mutually canceled, to the satisfaction and contentment of both parties. But it is now too late, for there are great difficulties connected with divorce. [See, pp 292-293].

The secret is in the art of Arbitrariness [See, p 295]. Therefore, one must learn to enjoy the accidental. They must be able to avoid permanent types, they will ruin one's ability to perfect the Rotation method.

The Text: Diary of the Seducer

No actual seduction takes place in this account. It's a matter of getting the girl's affection but being able to back out. It runs blow by blow through Kierkegaard's experience. But in this account the center piece is the Rotation method. What he says about the mirror on pages 311 is Hegelian representation of Truth. For Kierkegaard Truth is not like a mirror, which is an objective image, but a subjective content.

The heroine's name is Cordelia, an illusion to being the faithful or valuable one to King Lear. [See, p 332]. We do get a confession of true love [See, 380], but the Aesthetic life is essentially a cynical life.

The Text: Volume II: Aesthetic Validity of Marriage

This is most likely the part of the book that was written first.

1. Kierkegaard may have believed that he could get Regine back. In the Journals he seems to hope against hope to get Regine. This section was written at a time when Kierkegaard was attending Schelling's lectures---Kierkegaard must partly believe the content of the second volume. He talks about romantic love. In books and plays at the end the hero and heroine get together and live happily ever after. Romantic love has a sensuous aspect to it. The question is how to make it continue. He makes an illusion to Byron who wrote that Love is Heaven and Marriage is Hell.

Kierkegaard notes that there are two types of

melancholy [for those of us that are counting]:

1. Egotistic Melancholy--> concerned that the marriage might curtail one's own enjoyment. The feeling of being in over one's head.
2. Sympathetic Melancholy-> concerned that it might curtail or inhibit the other's enjoyment.

Not either romantic love or marriage out of a sense of obligation. Acting in a responsible way, acknowledging obligation to enhance romantic love [knowing that one is needed].

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III. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD

A. Either/Or

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Concluding Thoughts on Either/Or

Either/Or could be read as Kierkegaard's answer to Romanticism and its attitudes towards Life and Love. What is Romanticism? Good question. Brown's "shooting from the hip" definition would be: that Romanticism was a movement, a reaction against the Age of Enlightenment, Rationalism & Kantianism. Its stress is that Reality is more than the Rational---more than what can be apprehended by critical thinking. It accuses 18th century thinking of being too cerebral. The emotions are ignored. It sees that in Emotions a motion of infinity. It sees the human predicament bound up with our finitude. We are finite beings that have a craving for infinitude. [See, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol 7, pp 206ff]. Brown then cited a verse from Goethe's Faust [See, Jesus in European Protestant Thought, pp 76, 77].

Hegel, in turn, is a Romantic, not in the way that Goethe was a Romantic (a poet) but in his concern with the Eternal within the realm of Time and Space. And what Kierkegaard is reacting to in Either/Or is to Romanticism.

Romanticism can be seen in Either/Or in two versions. A, the Aesthete, rides Romanticism to death with his cynicism and B, the Ethicist, rationalizes his romanticism. What Kierkegaard is doing is working Romanticism to its conclusions. A riding it to death and B bringing Romantic Love in line with the concept of obligation.

The subject-matter of the philosophical science of right is the Idea of right, i.e., the concept of right together with the actualization of the concept. [See, Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, 1821, p 9].

The philosophical science is the concept of right with regards to Marriage and Family life [sounds like a Fuller concentration]. the bonds of marriage and family life on the surface seem to stifle the freedom which the Romantic seeks but that sort of freedom (the proverbial "Absolute" freedom) is nothing more than an abstraction. True freedom is something that grows within the limitations of marriage and family life. This line of thought is the embodiment of the second part of the book, the Or portion. Judge William is responding to the young man's desire for freedom and fear of the possible passing of passionate love.

It is easy to see that such a way of thinking is no better served by an alliance for five years than by one of ten, or even by an alliance such as Saladin formed with the Christian, for ten years, ten months, ten weeks, ten days, and ten minutes. . . There is also something upon which you will agree with me entirely, for how often and how surely have your mockery and your irony hit the mark when you were denouncing what you call "fortuitous love affairs" and the "bad infinity" of love---when one is looking with his sweetheart out of the window, and that instant a young girl turns the corner into another street, and it occurs to him, "It is with her I am really in love," but when he would follow her trace he is again unsettled, etc. [See, Bretall, p86].

A is always falling in love, which obviously leads to a multitude of problems. This eventually leads A to employ a very cynical attitude of settling on "Enjoying whatever moment one finds oneself in." "Bad infinity" is a technical Hegelian term. "Infinity" can be subdivided into two groups. The first group sees "Infinity" in numerical terms. The problem with this idea is that it leads to a cyclic dilemma of "the highest number thought of plus one . . .", therefore a "bad" infinity. It sees things as a complex whole with a multitude of parts. The second view is the idea of the completion of the whole made up with the unity of supplementary parts.

Hope and Recollection.

Both have a wrong relation to time. The healthy individual lives at once both in hope and in recollection, and only thereby does his life acquire true and substantial continuity. [See, Bretall, p 91].

Judge William (B) is talking like a true existentialist, that is authentic existence actualizes in and the commitments.

Equilibrium.

The last portion of Either/Or given in Bretall's Anthology is the "Equilibrium." It is a reflection on choosing. It is an Either/Or between one thing or another. The argument is developed on discovering ones true self in or by the process of choosing. Real choice is not between right and wrong but to make moral decisions between good and evil:

You will perceive also in what I have just been saying how essentially my view of choice differs from yours (if you can properly be said

to have any view), for yours differs precisely in the fact that it prevents you from choosing. For me the instant of choice is very serious, not so much on account of the rigorous cogitation involved in weighing the alternatives, not on account on the multiplicity of thoughts which attach themselves to every link in the chain, but rather because there is danger afoot, danger that the next instant it may not be equally in my power to choose, that something already has been lived which must be lived over again. To think that for an instant one can keep one's personality a blank, or that strictly speaking one can break off and bring to a halt the course of the personal life, is a delusion. The personality is already interested in the choice before one chooses, and when the choice is postponed the personality chooses unconsciously, or the choice is made by obscure powers within it. So when at last the choice is made, one discovers (unless, as I remarked before, the personality has been completely volatilized) that there is something which must be done over again, something which must be revoked, and this is often very difficult. [See, Bretall, p 103].

This selection concerns choices being made, and their nature.

My either/or does not in the first instance denote the choice between good and evil, it denotes the choice whereby one chooses good and evil/or excludes them. [See, Bretall, p 107].

Deliberate choices need to be made (or they will be made for you, see above). Judge William is trying to bring A from his Aestheticism to a Moral position in which he will regain the aesthetic within the confines of marriage and family life.

QUESTION: Where is Kierkegaard in all of this?

Good question. He hiding somewhere behind the Neither/Nor position. He doesn't give his weight to the aesthete or the ethicist.

QUESTION: Define Existentialism.

Brown's use of Existentialism is that it is an attempt to philosophize from the standpoint of one who lives and must make moral choices (this contrasted with the classical position of detached purely rational choices). Existentialism attempts to philosophize about existence. It wants to examine what is authentic and inauthentic of existence. It concerns the philosophizing of Being. It

discounts the Bible and traditional Religion. It reflects on Being. Sartre et al, come more from a tradition espoused by Hegel than from Kierkegaard. Hegel was one to reflect on the structure of Being, our relation to Being, and History to Being. 20th century existentialist's write a great deal about Being and Alienation of Being. This is more Hegelian than Kierkegaardian.

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B. Fear & Trembling

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Background: The Historical Setting

1. Kierkegaard's engagement with Regine had broken up in October 1841.
2. Either/Or had been published.
3. Kierkegaard had begun to work on a piece entitled De Omnibus Dubitandum Est ("Concerning Everything, There Must Be Doubt").
4. Easter Sunday (1842) he attends church in Copenhagen, Mynster is preaching and Regina sees Kierkegaard and nods at him. This sends Kierkegaard into an emotional tailspin. [See, Journals and Paper, 5653, vol 5, p 229].
5. Kierkegaard flees to Berlin (again) not realizing that Regine is to be engaged to Schlegel (summer of 1843).
6. While in Berlin he begins Fear and Trembling/Repetitions. This new work is a new Either/Or. It covers much of the same ground but in this excursion Kierkegaard looks at the problem with the elements of Faith and the Christian Religion and how they might apply. He writes that if he had had Faith he would have stayed. The person of Faith would overcome all difficulties. [See, Journals and Papers, 5664, vol 5, p 233]. Kierkegaard is sensitive to everything.

Background: Theme

The motivation power to Kierkegaard is love. It is the regulating clock gear that maintains the balance of movement.

The book is a series of meditation on Abraham especially Abraham's call to sacrifice his son Isaac in Genesis 22. The work has a motto [See, Fear & Trembling, new critical edition, p 3]: Tarquinius Superbus ("Tarquin the Proud"). The motto is a coded message, as is the whole book. The motto is from a legend that was passed on by J.G. Hamann, whom Kierkegaard called the Magus of the North (who in turn called Kant the "Prussian Hume"---with all of this

name calling it's any wonder they wrote so much). Tarquin was thought to be the last of the ancient kings of Rome (circa 530 B.C.). He captured the neighboring city of Gabii, gathered the local leaders of the city but was unsure about what to do with them. So he sent a messenger to his father for his advice. His father didn't trust the messenger so he took him into a courtyard and with a stick knocked the heads off of the tallest poppies in the garden. He then told the messenger to tell Tarquin what he saw. Thus the saying, "The son understood, but the messenger did not." (Tarquin was to execute just the prominent leaders of the city).

Background: The Author

This book is authored by Johannes de Silentio (John from the Silence). There are several illusion from the pseudonym. One thinks of the John the beloved disciple who was later exiled to Patmos; cut off from society. And thus Kierkegaard saw himself as a disciple. The theme of one that is cut off from society is very prominent in this book. The reason for this "cut off-ness" is the irrationality of Faith that Kierkegaard will expound on.

Johannes says of himself, "Here I stop, I am not a poet, I only speak dialectic." [See, new critical edition, p 90]. In another place he says that he is not a philosopher, that he has no system, nor the mind for it [See, new critical edition, p 7]. He writes in a dialectical lyric. It's a lyric because it is an outpouring of the heart. It is dialectical in terms of being a lyric which is expressed philosophically and reflectively.

Background: How It Was Received

Only 525 were made in the first printing. It took 3 years to sell 300 copies (definitely not even a near-best seller). The book was reviewed, however, by Bishop Mynster (who used the pseudonym KTS) and was called a remarkable book. [See, new critical edition, "Historical Introduction," p xxxiv]. Kierkegaard's own opinion was that once he was dead that Fear & Trembling will be enough to assure his position as a memorable author (philosopher/theologian). A modest opinion of the book.

Background: Subject-Matter

FAITH. It contends with the question of how faith fits into Life or rather how Faith doesn't fit into any of our rational schemes of thinking.

Abraham is a prototype believer called to do something that can't be rationalized. [See, Journal & Papers, 4650, and new critical edition, pp 266-267]. He is in exile among his contemporaries. Faith becomes Faith in the absurd. Kierkegaard is sharpening the point. He is arguing that God at his command can't be rationalized or justified. Because

God is beyond our scope of understanding he can't be justified. Thus Faith and the Object of Faith is absurd.

Background: Compared to Kant

In the Preface of his work Religion with the Limits of Reason Alone Kant writes that morality is getting back to rational first principles: "Act only on maxims which you could will to become a universal law of nature." The important question in working within this moral maxim is, could/can this action be made into a general law? Moral actions can be brought to that level. Kant feels that all religions can be reduced to such moral laws. Religion is essentially "a way of teaching and practicing morality," this is especially true for those that cannot think in philosophic terms. Religion serves this purpose. Thus Jesus is merely a moral teacher. Kierkegaard questions whether you can reduce religion to ethics.

Text: Fear & Trembling

It is essentially a series of reflections regarding Abraham and Genesis 22. Bretall begins with the Preliminary Expectoration [See, Bretall, p 118 and new critical edition, p 37]:

. . . Abraham I cannot understand, in a certain sense there is nothing I can learn from him but astonishment. If people fancy that by considering the outcome of this story they might be moved to believe, they deceive themselves and want to swindle God out of the first movement of faith, the infinite resignation. They would such worldly wisdom out of the paradox. Perhaps one or another may succeed in that, for our age is not willing to stop with faith, with its miracle of turning water into wine; it goes further, it turns wine into water.

Kierkegaard notes that we can only understand things that has a ration explanation. Thus it defies understanding.

Swindled? God is swindled because people want to reduce Faith to rational justifications.

Would it not be better to stop with faith, and is it not revolting that everybody wants to go further? . . . Would it not be better that they should stand still at faith, and that he who stands should take heed lest he fall? For the movements of faith must constantly be made by virtue of the absurd, yet in such a way, be it observed, that one does not lose the finite but gains it every inch. For my part I can well describe the movements of faith, but I cannot

make them. When one would learn to make the motions of swimming one can let oneself be hung by a swimming-belt from the ceiling and go through the motions (describe them, so to speak, as we speak of describing a circle), but one is not swimming. In that way I can describe the movements of faith, but when I am thrown into the water, I swim, it is true (for I don't belong to the beach-waders), but I make other movements, I make the movements of infinity, whereas faith does the opposite: after having made the movements of infinity, it makes those in finiteness. [See, Bretall, p 118].

All we can do is describe/talk about the observable/phenomenon. The inner reality is something else. Wittgenstein writes, "'You can't hear God speak to someone else, only when being addressed directly'---that is a grammatical remark." [See, Wittgenstien, Zettel ("Notes"), 717, p 124e]. Regarding the motions of faith, we can see persons overt behavior but we can't see what's inside them. The outer form is not what's Reality. Noting the form of the proposition but as to the meaning, no one else can do it but you (that's what he means when he calls it a grammatical remark). The motions are identical but not the same.

Regarding the "movements of Infinity", Kierkegaard is saying that Faith doesn't belong to the form of this world but through Faith we can recover this world.

Hail to him who can make those movements, he performs the marvelous and I shall never grow tired of admiring him, whether he be Abraham or a slave in Abraham's house; whether he be a professor of philosophy or a servant-girl, I look only at the movements. But at them I do look and do not let myself be fooled, either by myself or by any other man. The knights of the infinite resignation are easily recognized: their gait is gliding and assured. Those on the other hand who carry the jewel of faith are likely to be delusive, because their outward appearance bears a striking resemblance to that which both the infinite resignation and faith profoundly despise---to Philistinism.

I candidly admit that in my practice I have not found any reliable example of the knight of faith, though I would not therefore deny that every second man may be such an example. I have been trying, however, for several years to get on the track of this, and all in vain. People commonly travel around the world to see rivers and mountains, new stars, birds of rare plumage, queerly deformed fishes, ridiculous breeds of men---they abandon themselves to the bestial stupor which gapes at existence, and they think

they have seen something. This does not interest me. But if I knew where there was such a knight of faith, I would make a pilgrimage to him of foot, for this prodigy interests me absolutely. i would not let go of him for an instant, every moment I would watch to see how he managed to make the movements, I would regard myself as secured for life and would divide my time between looking at him and practicing the exercises myself, and thus would spend all my time admiring him. [See, Bretall, p 119].

The Knights of Faith and of Resignation are obvious illusions to fairie tales about knights who won the fair maiden, etc. Another aspect of this illusion is to the insignia found particularly on the picture of Bishop Mynster [See, J. Gill, ed, Essays on Kierkegaard] and other Prelates as to being made Knights of this or that order.

The Knights of Infinite resignation are a stoic sort that can handle themselves and that have given up hope and the fair maiden, etc. The Knights of Faith, on the other hand, cannot be recognized by outward appearances. That is because Faith itself cannot be recognized. They really live in the world and appear somewhat worldly, but they view it from a different angle. Essentially the Knights of Faith "suffer" from the same affliction that the Messiah suffered, Incognito.

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III. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD
B. Fear & Trembling

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Preliminary Comments On Fear & Trembling

Comments regarding the Knight of Faith:

1. The description of the Knight of Faith is somewhat of a counterpart with Christ, he is essentially incognito. Kierkegaard can't recognize him. He's easily mistaken for a worldly person. Brown confesses that this is an anachronistic point, though, that in some ways Kierkegaard's view of the Incarnation (that is expressed later in the Philosophical Fragments) is adopted or in line with this view of Faith as expressed in Fear & Trembling).

2. Brown's view of role modeling. Brown is perplexed by the concept. Two thoughts: (1) he can't see himself as playing the part of a role model, (2) he can't recall ever seeing a reliable example to model ones life on. He's afraid of the mass-produced, mass-market mentality fed by this concept.³

The Text: Fear & Trembling: The Knight of Faith and the Knight of Infinite Resignation

With the Knight of Faith and the Knight of Infinite Resignation Kierkegaard describes life like a poet, reacting to his impressions. It interesting to note that he is writing at the same time as his contemporary, Hans Christian Andersen, with whom he did not get along with. Thus Fairie Tales were in vogue at the time.

There is a certain similarity between the Knight of Faith and the Knight of Infinite Resignation. The Knight of Infinite Resignation appears, however, to be a more impressive figure. He renounces the world, keeping it at arms-length. There is a certain renunciation that people admire. While the Knight of Faith doesn't outwardly betray his inner workings and therefore he appears to be worldly.

I candidly admit that in my practice I have not found any reliable example of the knight of faith, though I would not therefore deny that every second man may be such an example. I have been trying, however, for several years to get on the track of this, and all in vain. People commonly travel around the world to see rivers and mountains, new stars, birds of rare plumage, queerly deformed fishes, ridiculous breeds of men---they abandon themselves to the bestial stupor which gapes at existence, and they think

they have seen something. This does not interest me. But if I knew where there was such a knight of faith, I would make a pilgrimage to him of foot, for this prodigy interests me absolutely. I would not let go of him for an instant, every moment I would watch to see how he managed to make the movements, I would regard myself as secured for life and would divide my time between looking at him and practicing the exercises myself, and thus would spend all my time admiring him. [See, Bretall, p 119].

You can't see faith. True faith can't be seen. Kierkegaard would like to find a Knight of Faith to use as a role model, but he can't find him. Therefore, he must use a hypothetical example of what it would be like. He uses what will later be called a Grammar of Faith or Grammar of Ascent.

As was said, I have not found any such person, but I can well think him. Here he is. Acquaintance made, I am introduced to him. The moment I set eyes on him I instantly push him from me, I myself leap backwards, I clasp my hands and say half aloud, "Good Lord, is this the man? Is it really he? Why, he looks like a tax-collector!" However, it is the man after all. I draw closer to him, watching his least movements to see whether there might not be visible a little heterogeneous fractional telegraphic message from the infinite, a glance, a look, a gesture, a note of sadness, a smile, which betrayed the infinite in its heterogeneity with the finite. No! I examine his figure from tip to toe to see if there might be a cranny through which the infinite was peeping. No! He is solid through and through. His tread? It is vigorous, belonging entirely to finiteness; no smartly dressed townsman who walks out to Fresberg on a Sunday afternoon treads the ground more firmly; he belongs entirely to the world, no Philistine more so. One can discover nothing of that aloof and superior nature whereby one recognizes the knight of the infinite.

He takes delight in everything, and whenever one see him taking part in a particular pleasure, he does it with the persistence which is the mark of the earthly man whose soul is absorbed in such things. He tends to his work. So when one looks at him one might suppose that he was a clerk who had lost his soul in an intricate system of bookkeeping, so precise is he. He takes a holiday on Sunday. He goes to church. No heavenly glance or any other token of the incommensurable betrays him; if one did not know

him, it would be impossible to distinguish him from the rest of the congregation, for his healthy and vigorous hymn-singing proves at the most that he has a good chest. . . He lives as a carefree as a ne'er-do-well, and yet he buys up the acceptable time at the dearest price, for he does not do the least thing except by virtue of the absurd. [See, Bretall, pp 119-121].

This is Kierkegaard's poetic description of what a believer may look like. There are obvious New Testament parallels or allusions to Matthew 6:33, Be anxious for nothing but accept what may come; and 1 Corinthians 7, live life as if (a free slave, bound freeman). He is one who embraces life from the standpoint of faith; bringing a new quality to ordinary things in life. His actions are just like anyone else but the transforming quality of faith on the inside changes everything. Rationally this is absurd. He contrasts the Knight of Faith and the Knight of Infinite Resignation.

Kierkegaard then returns to his own story with the tale about the Swain and the Princess [See, Bretall, p 121]. The Swain ventures everything. The Princess could also but doesn't [See, Bretall, p 124] showing that she is not like him.

He returns to a description of the Knight of Infinite Resignation:

In the infinite resignation there is peace and rest; every man who will, who has not abased himself by scorning himself (which is still more dreadful than being proud) can train himself to make these movements. The infinite resignation is that shirt we read about in the old fable. The thread is spun under tears, the cloth bleached with tears, the shirt sewn with tears; but then too it is a better protection than iron and steel. The imperfection in the fable is that a third party can manufacture this shirt. The secret in life is that everyone must sew it for himself, and the astonishing thing is that a man can sew it fully as well as a woman. In the infinite resignation there is peace and rest and comfort in sorrow---that is, if the movement is mad normally. [See, Bretall, p 125].

This is not a put-down of the Knight of Infinite Resignation, but an assessment that one is resigning oneself to the facts and protecting oneself from heartbreak and renouncing hope. But it is not the same with Faith. But it is the last step before Faith.

The infinite resignation is the last stage prior to faith, so that one who has not made this movement has not faith; for only in the infinite resignation do I become clear to myself with

respect to my eternal validity, and only then can there be any question of grasping existence by virtue of faith. [See, Bretall, p 125].

Infinite Resignation is something that can be done by ones self. Faith is only possible for God to fulfill. With God all things are possible. This includes the Absurd (from the standpoint of reason). It's bringing God into the reckoning which according to the world's standpoint is absurd.

Now we will let the knight of faith appear in the role just described. He makes exactly the same movements as the other knight, infinitely renounces claim to the love which is the content of his life, he is reconciled in pain; but then occurs the prodigy, he makes still another movement more wonderful than all, for he says, "I believe nevertheless that I shall get her, in virtue, that is, of the absurd, in virtue of the fact that with God all things are possible." The absurd is not one of the factors which can be discriminated within the proper compass of the understanding: it is not identical with the improbable, the unexpected, the unforeseen. At the moment when the knight made the act of resignation, he was convinced, humanly speaking, of the impossibility. This was the result reached by the understanding, and he had sufficient energy to think it. On the other hand, in an infinite sense it was possible, namely by renouncing it; but this sort of possessing is at the same time a relinquishing, and yet there is no absurdity in this for the understanding, for the understanding continued to be in the right in affirming that in the world of the finite, where it holds sway, this was and remained an impossibility. This is quite as clear to the knight of faith, so the only thing that can save him is the absurd, and this he grasps by faith. So he recognizes the impossibility, and that very instant he believes the absurd; for if, without recognizing the impossibility with all the passion of his soul and with all his heart, he should wish to imagine that he has faith, he deceives himself, and his testimony has no bearing, since he has not even reached the infinite resignation

Faith therefore is not an aesthetic emotion but something far higher, precisely because it has resignation as its presupposition; it is not an immediate instinct of the heart, but is the paradox of life and existence. [See, Bretall, pp 125-126].

Kierkegaard applies this to his situation with Regine and

says that by faith he could regain her (this is obviously before he learns of her engagement to Schlegel). Faith is not just renunciation but gaining everything.

By faith I make renunciation of nothing; on the contrary, by faith I acquire everything, precisely in the sense in which it is said that he who has faith like a grain of mustard can remove mountains. A purely human courage is required to renounce the whole of the temporal to gain the eternal; but this I do gain, and to all eternity I cannot renounce it---that being a self-contradiction. [See, Bretall, pp 127-128].

In an odd way faith is a positive affirmation in the world. It is a kind of dialectic. Starts with worldliness:

- (1) The worldly person is absorbed in the world,
- (2) he/she resigns and renounces the world,
- (3) he/she enters a new relation with the world in the light of faith.

There is a tension here between the renunciation and reception and the absorption. The highest isn't withdrawal from the world but a life of faith.

QUESTION: How can Faith be absurd when Kierkegaard uses rational arguments to prove it?

Kierkegaard uses the rational arguments to point out the Form of Faith as opposed to Reason. It's something like Aquinas writing that one can prove the existence of God but cannot know what He is like. What is it then? The bottomline is that it impacts his existence. It is the Paradoxical Passion.

The Text: Fear & Trembling: PROBLEM I, Is There Such A Thing As A Teleological Suspension Of The Ethical?

Abraham is the paradigm believer (so says Romans and Hebrews). He is the test case. What he was called to do was irrational and immoral and we must deal with it.

Basic Notions:

1. Ethical. Ethical has to do with the universal. It is to the moral level what the laws of science are to the scientific level. To Hegel and Kant the Ethics were the universal laws of conduct. On page 346 on the New Critical edition of Fear and Trembling there is a reference to various writings done by Hegel on Ethics.

Kant was trying to get to the essence of what constituted a moral action. He asked whether an action could be universalized. If everybody did it what would be the result?

Hegel presented the idea of mediation, the

actualization of the universal. It is not just the recognition of the universal but the embodiment of the universal that is important in the sphere of the Family and the State. Its a matter of not just "Knowing" but "Doing." Kierkegaard is not quarreling with either Kant or Hegel but the question for Kierkegaard is if there are any occasions of getting beyond the Ethical?

2. Teleological. It comes from the Greek word telos which signifies the idea of purpose or design of nature. This ties in with Kierkegaard's question by clarifying it to ask: Can the Ethic ever be suspended for a higher purpose or design?

If such be the case, then Hegel is right when, in dealing with the Good and Conscience, he characterizes man merely as the particular and regards this character as "a moral for of the evil" which is to be annulled in the teleology of the moral, so that the individual who remains in this stage is either sinning or subjected to temptation (Anfechtung). On the other hand, he is wrong in talking of faith, wrong in not protesting loudly and clearly against the fact that Abraham enjoys honor and glory as the father of faith, whereas he ought to be prosecuted and convicted of murder. [See, Bretall, p 130].

Abraham is the test case. He is called the father of all that believe and his "sacrifice" of Isaac is treated not as an incidental act but is central to his faith.

For faith is this paradox. that the particular is higher than the universal---yet in such a way, be it observed, that the movement repeats itself, and that consequently the individual, after having been in the universal, now as the particular isolates himself as higher than the universal. If this be not faith, then Abraham is lost, then faith has never existed in the world--because it has always existed. For if the ethical (i.e., the moral) is the highest thing, and if nothing incommensurable remains in man in any other way but as the evil (i.e. the particular which has to be expressed in the universal), then one needs no other categories than those which the Greeks possessed or which by consistent thinking can be derived from them. This fact Hegel ought not to have concealed, for after all he was acquainted with Greek though . .

Faith is precisely this paradox. that the individual as the particular is higher than the universal, is justified over against it, is not subordinate but superior---yet in such a way, be

it observed, that it is the particular individual who, after he has been subordinated as the particular to the universal, now through the universal becomes the individual who as the particular is superior to the universal, inasmuch as the individual as the particular stands in an absolute relation to the absolute. The position cannot be mediated, for all mediation comes about precisely by virtue of the universal; it is and remains to all eternity a paradox, inaccessible to thought. And yet faith is this paradox . . . [See, Bretall, p 130].

There is a dialectic at work here. The dialectic regards the particular being in "absolute relation to the Absolute." Kierkegaard illustrates this point with three examples.

Abraham And The Tragic Heroes of Literature (History)

In these three examples the act of sacrifice was performed to achieve the good (self sacrifice is not mentioned because in it achieving the good is taken for granted).

1. Agamemnon and his daughter Iphigenia. Kierkegaard mentions the play written by Euripides about these two. Goethe also wrote a play based on their story which was admired greatly by Hegel [See, W. Kaufman, Hegel Reinterpreted, pp 44ff]. D.F. Strauss felt that the Old Testament story about Abraham was influenced by the Greek myth. Brown's (and Kierkegaard's) objection to this hypothesis was that in the Greek story there is a reason (for the sake of the Nation---which is a dig directed at Hegel. [See, Bretall, p 131].

2. Jephtha [See, Bretall, p 132]. Brown feels that the problem with the Jephtha story is that it is a case of mistaken note of conscience, that is, he allowed his conscience to circumvent the moral laws. Strictly speaking, conscience is not mentioned in the Old Testament (there are allusions to ones "heart" but as far as actual conscience, no). Brown feels that the reason for this is the Old Testament's emphasis upon following the "written Word" of God (as opposed to following a subjective feeling).

3. Brutus and his son. Actually it was Brutus' son against the Law. This is a pointed example because there was a rational justification for this execution. This is not true with Abraham's act.

Here is evident the necessity of a new category if one would understand Abraham. Such a relationship to the deity paganism did not know. The tragic hero does not enter into any private relationship with the deity, but for him the

ethical is the divine, hence the paradox implied in his situation can be mediated in the universal. [See, Bretall, p 133].

The universal was the higher good of the State, which is why these men are called Tragic Heroes.

Abraham cannot be mediated, and the same thing can be expressed also by saying that he cannot talk. As soon as I talk I express the universal, and if I do not do so, no one can understand me. therefore if Abraham would express himself in terms of the universal, he must say that his situation is a temptation (Anfechtung), for he has no higher expression for that universal which stands above the universal which he transgresses. [See, Bretall, p 133].

This was the difference between Abraham and the Tragic Heroes (above), Abraham had no rational/moral reason.

The story of Abraham contains therefore a teleological suspension of the ethical. As the individual he became higher than the universal: this is the paradox which does not permit of mediation. It is just as inexplicable how he got into it as it is inexplicable how he remained in it. [See, Bretall, p 134].

What's The Conclusion?

Kaufman feels that Kierkegaard is trying to advocate blind authoritarianism. This seems to be a contradiction of terms. Is Kierkegaard trying to justify (rationalize) it?

1. Kierkegaard has shown that there is a teleological suspension of the ethical, in the case of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. One can't argue from this that all suspensions of the ethical are teleological. One can't justify crimes.

2. Kierkegaard agrees with Hegel and Kant that the ethical is self-contained and justified. In opposition to that idea, he would contend that the Christian life transcends the ethical. That is, can one resolve personal problems in the ethical ("law of nature")? The two great commandments to love do not require a suspension of the ethical but some problems can't be resolved by simply appealing to the ethical.

3. Zeitel, p 717---> One cannot hear God speaking to someone else.

4. The Paradigms case. Remember that Hegel wanted to build a philosophical system that would rationally explain/express Christianity. Kierkegaard felt that Hegel couldn't fit Abraham's case into a rational set.

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III. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD

C. Repetition

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Additional Kierkegaard Bibliography

R. C. Perkins, ed., Kierkegaard, Fear & Trembling: A Critical Appraisal, University of Alabama Press.

Dunning, Kierkegaard, Dialectic of Inwardness, Princeton.

Schleife & Markley, Kierkegaard And Literature.

Lebowitz, Kierkegaard, A Life of Allegory.

G. Malantschuk, The Controversial Kierkegaard.

A. Kahn, "Salighed" As Happiness? Kierkegaard On The Concept of "Salighed".

Background of Repetition

It was published on the same day as Fear & Trembling. Lowrie is under the opinion that Repetition was written first. 512 copies were printed but after 4 years only 272 copies had been sold. He had gone to Berlin after breaking his engagement and wrote Either/Or. Repetition was written following (during) a second trip to Berlin. In many ways it parallels Either/Or. When combined with Fear & Trembling, Repetition follows the Either/Or pattern of presenting two views of the same subject. Kierkegaard seemed to followed this "doublet" theme of publishing with the two volume Either/Or, the companion books Fear & Trembling and Repetition and also the combination of The Philosophical Fragments with The Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments. This pair-publishing is an echo-counterpart-response to Hegelianism in that it presents two views that in sum don't completely express the whole "system."

In a way the Repetition echoes the "Rotation Method" of Either/Or. In "The Rotation Method" the young cynic rotates his pleasures, avoiding commitment and making the most of enjoying his pleasures. In Repetition the protagonist goes back to a place (rotates back) to again experience a past pleasure. There is an explicit reference to the Rotation Method in the Repetition on page 302 of the new critical edition (nce).

What Does Kierkegaard Mean By "Repetition"?

From a journal entry we read:

April '55

One of my pseudonyms has written a little book called Repetition, in which he denies that there is repetition. Without being quite in disagreement with him in the deeper sense, I may very well be of the opinion that there nevertheless is a repetition, yes, that it is the true happiness, that there is a repetition, since there are situations and circumstances in which repetition is so extremely needed.

When something is said to people that they do not want to hear, something true, the usual way they use in seeking to avoid what is in essential opposition to them, to avoid letting the truth decisively exercise its power over them and over conditions---the usual way to treat the discourse on the truth as daily news and then say: We have heard that once---as if it were the day's news they were listening to when it was said for the first time and now they want to be done with it, just as one ignores the day's news, which cannot stand a second hearing . . .

Consequently, in relation to the day's news etc., repetition is more intolerable with each repetition. In relation to earnestness, repetition is all the more needed every time what is said is not received for appropriate action, has one more reason than previously . . . [See, Fear & Trembling/Repetition, NCE, p 329-330].

There are times in life when one must go back to square one and face the music (which is the opposite of the Rotation Method). One must face up to things and not run away, but go back. This is not to say that one should engage in repetition for repetition's sake. One must follow this step by taking the appropriate action. In Repetition Constantine Constantius took the inappropriate action.

What lies herein contrasts with other styles of philosophizing and seems to draw off of the Greek idea of History repeating itself. Kierkegaard contrasts this to the Greek idea of Recollection. But it is much more than recollecting/remembering. It is a matter of placing ones self back at the point of departure in a spiritual, emotional, intellectual and possibly physical sense.

Author: Constantine Constantius

Brown's thought regarding this name is that the form of the last name is a Latin adjective "more" form, e.i., "more constant." Thus, the name figures to mean "Constantine the more Constant." He is a cynical observer, somewhat of an evil genius. He is a shadow figure that holds up possibilities for human existence in a sort of twisted

manner.

Characters: Constantine Constantius & "The Young Man"

There are only two main characters in the book, Constantine Constantius and "the Young Man." Constantine Constantius offers his best advice to the young man whose love affair had gone wrong. In a way the two characters are aspects of Kierkegaard.

Form

Like Either/Or Repetition has two parts. The 1st is a series of reflections and the 2nd is a collection of letters. The order is reversed somewhat from the form of Either/Or. The reflections in the 1st part are authored by Constantine Constantius and the letters in the 2nd part are by the young man. The pattern of writing a novel in the form of letters (a series of letters) was a little belated [See, Goethe, Sufferings of Young Werther].

Theme

A Biblical theme emerges in the 2nd part of the book which is series of reflections on the book of Job. (This can be contrast to the theme of Fear & Trembling, Genesis 22 and Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac).

Text: Repetition

The book begins with a report from Constantine Constantius about unhappy love and the impossibility of marriage for the young man.

Just as lovers frequently resort to the poet's words to let the sweet distress of love break forth in blissful joy, so also did he. As he paced back and forth, he repeated again and again a verse from Paul Moller:

"Then, to my easy chair,
Comes a dream from my youth.
To my easy chair.
A heartfelt longing come over me for you,
Thou sun of women."

His eyes filled with tears, he threw himself down on a chair, he repeated the verse again and again. I was shaken by the scene. Good God, I thought, never in my practice had I seen such melancholy as this. [See, NCE, pp 135-136; Bretall, p 135].

The problem was how to treat this melancholy. Constantine

Constantius suggests a series of things:

1. recollection,
2. going out and enjoying ones self,
3. taking on a mistress [that's the evil genius in Constantine Constantius, the idea was to make him look worldly and wicked] [See, NCE, pp 132, 138; Bretall, p 135],
4. go on a journey, shrug off the past and start a new.

Bretall records the section of the book regarding Constantine Constantius' repeat trip to Berlin where he tries to recapture or re-experience some old times. Kierkegaard sparked a bit of a controversy when he mentions his choice of the three theaters available in Berlin (Ballet, Serious Drama & Farce). Kierkegaard (Constantine Constantius) choose the farce. He says that the Farce speaks to him. Constantine Constantius' trip is somewhat of a failure because he merely tries to recapture the external. His concluding remarks repeat this disappointment and desire (for repetition).

Long live the stagecoach horn! It is the instrument for me for many reasons, and chiefly because one can never be certain of wheeling the same notes from this horn. A coach horn has infinite possibilities, and the person who puts it to his mouth and puts his wisdom into it can never be guilty of a repetition, and he who instead of giving an answer gives his friend a coach horn to use as he pleases says nothing but explains everything. Praised be the coach horn! It is my symbol. Just as the ancient ascetics placed a skull on the table, the contemplation of which constituted their view of life, so the coach horn on my table always reminds me of the meaning of life. Long live the coach horn! But the journey is not with the trouble, for one need not stir from the spot to be convinced that there is no repetition. No, one sits calmly in one's living room; when all is vanity and passes away, one nevertheless speeds faster than on a train, even though sitting still. Everything is to remind me of that; my servant will be dressed as a postilion, and I myself will not drive to a dinner party except by special coach. Farewell! Farewell! You exuberant hope of youth, what is your hurry? After all, what you are hunting for does not exist, and same goes for you yourself! Farewell, you masculine vim and vigor! Why are you stamping the ground so violently? What you are stepping on is an illusion! Farewell, you

conquering resolve! You will reach your goal, all right, for you cannot take the deed along with you without turning around, and that you cannot do! Farewell, loveliness of the woods! When I wanted to behold you, you were withered! Travel on, you fugitive river! You are the only one who really knows what you want, for you want only to flow along and lose yourself in the sea, which is never filled! Move on, you drama of life---let no one call it a comedy, no one a tragedy, for no one saw the end. Move on, you drama of existence, where life is not given again any more than money is! Why has no one returned from the dead? Because life does not know how to captivate as death does, because life does not have the persuasiveness that death has. Yes, death is very persuasive if only one does not contradict it but lets it do the talking; then it is instantly convincing, so that no one has ever had an objection to make or has longed for the eloquence of life. O death! Great is your persuasiveness, and next to you there is no one who can speak as beautifully as the man whose eloquence gave him the name peisithanatos ["persuader to death"], because with his power of persuasion he talked about you! [See, NCE, pp 175-176].

This passage taken as it stands seems to espouse nihilistic existentialism. But then there's part two of the book.

The young man followed Constantine Constantius' advice and the result is given in a series of reflection on the Book of Job. The problems addressed in Fear & Trembling on a religious level are addressed here on an aesthetic level.

In the 4th letter (dated simply November 15) he begins the reflections.

In the whole Old Testament there is no other figure one approaches with so much human confidence and boldness and trust as Job, simply because he is so human in every way, because he resides in a confinium touching on poetry. Nowhere in the world has the passion of anguish found such expression. What are Philoctetes and his laments, which remain continually earthbound and do not terrify the gods. What is philoctetes' situation compared with Job's, where the idea is constantly in motion.

Forgive me for telling everything---after all, you are unable to answer. If anyone learned about this, I would be indescribably distressed. At night I can have all the lights burning, the whole house illuminated. Then I stand up and read in a loud voice, almost shouting, some

passage by him. Or I open my window and cry out his words into the world. If Job is a poetic character, if there never was any man who spoke this way, then I make his words my own and take upon myself the responsibility. I cannot do more, for who has such eloquence as Job, who is able to improve upon anything he said? [See, NCE, pp 204-205].

Kierkegaard seems to be familiar with Biblical criticism regarding the historical/poetic aspects of the book of Job. Kierkegaard then reflects upon the friends of Job.

The friends give Job enough to do; the conflict with them is a purgatory in which the thought that he nevertheless is in the right is purified. If he himself should lack the power and the ingenuity to disquiet his conscience and to terrify his soul, if he should lack the imagination to become afraid for himself because of the guilt and blame that might secretly dwell in his innermost being, then the friends help him with their obvious insinuations, with their offensive charges, which like envious divining rods might be able to call forth what lay in deepest concealment. [See, NCE, p 208].

This refers to the dynamic of Hegelianism. The true dynamic which is in Job's friends, in that they are working out the possibilities and problems (which is what Kierkegaard did for himself in Fear & Trembling).

Job's greatness, then, is not even that he said: The Lord gave, and the Lord took away; blessed be the name of the Lord---something he in fact said at the beginning and did not repeat later. Rather, Job's significance is that the disputes at the boundaries of faith are fought out in him, that the colossal revolt of the wild and aggressive powers of passion is present here.

. . . This category, ordeal, is not aesthetic, ethical, or dogmatic---it is altogether transcendent. Only as knowledge about an ordeal, that is is an ordeal, would it be included in a dogmatics. But as soon as the knowledge enters, the resilience of the ordeal is impaired, and the category is absolutely transcendent and places a person in a purely personal relationship of opposition to God, in a relationship such that he cannot allow himself to be satisfied with any explanation at second hand. [See, NCE, p 209-210].

In ordeals and suffering one becomes aware of the transcendent. The external can describe but only

introspection can really experience the transcendent.

The concluding letter is from Constantine Constantius to the readers of the book. He writes regarding bishops and the Hegelian concept of the Universal (in light of the exceptions). Working from the background of Luke 15:17, Constantine Constantius contends that the individual is greater than the general or universal. He writes about the young man as "my poet," that is Constantine Constantius claims a sort ownership of the young man (either referring to his pseudonymous nature or in the sense that by following his advice the young man was being created by Constantine Constantius).

A poet's life begins in conflict with all life. The point is to find reassurance or legitimation, for he must always lose the first conflict, and if he wants to win immediately, then he is unjustified. My poet now finds legitimation precisely in being absolved by life the moment he in a sense wants to destroy himself. His soul now gains a religious resonance. This is what actually sustains him, although it never attains a break-through. His dithyrambic joy in the last letter is an example of this, for beyond a doubt this joy is grounded in a religious mood, which remains something inward, however. He keeps a religious mood as a secret he cannot explain, while at the same time this secret helps him poetically to explain actuality. He explains the universal as repetition, and yet he himself understands repetition in another way, for although actuality becomes the repetition, for him the repetition is the raising of his consciousness to the second power. He has had what belongs essentially to a poet, a love affair, but a very ambivalent one: happy, unhappy, comic, tragic. With respect to the girl, everything may be construed as comic, for inasmuch as he was moved primarily by sympathy, his suffering was to a great extent a consequence of the beloved's suffering. If on that point he was mistaken, the comic becomes pronounced. If he looks to himself, then the tragic emerges, just as when he in another sense regards the beloved ideally. He has kept the whole love affair in its ideality, to which he can give any expression whatsoever, but always as mood, because he has no facticity. He has, then, a fact of consciousness, or, more correctly, he has no fact of consciousness but rather a dialectical resiliency that will make him productive of mood. While their productivity becomes his external aspect, he is sustained by something inexpressibly religious. In the

earlier letters, especially in some of them, the movement was much closer to a genuinely religious resolution, but the moment the temporary suspension is terminated, he gains himself again, but as a poet, and the religious founders, that is, becomes an inexpressible substratum.

If he had had a deeper religious background, he would not have become a poet. Then everything would have gained religious meaning. The situation in which he was trapped would then have gained meaning for him, but the collision would have come from higher levels, and he would also have had a quite different authority, even though it would have been purchased with still more painful suffering. Then he would have acted with an entirely different iron consistency and imperturbability, then he would have won a fact of consciousness to which he could constantly hold, one that would never become ambivalent for him but would be pure earnestness because it was established by him on the basis of a God relationship. [See, NCE 229-230].

Constantine Constantius acknowledges that there is still a deeper level. Repetition on the physical level alone does not satisfy. Neither Constantine Constantius nor the young man take the deeper route. Constantine Constantius then return to the imagery of the midwife.

My dear reader, you will now understand that the interest focuses on the young man, whereas I am a vanishing person, just like a midwife in relation to the child she has delivered. And that is indeed the case, for I have, so to speak, delivered him, and therefore as the elder I act as spokesman. My personality is a presupposition of consciousness that must be present in order to force him out, but my personality will never be able to attain what he attains, for the primitivity in which he comes forward is the other factor. So he has been in good hands from the very beginning, even though I frequently had to tease him so that he himself could emerge. At first sight, I perceived that he was a poet---if for no other reason I saw it in the a situation that would have been taken easily in stride by a lesser mortal expanded into a world event for him. [See, NCE, p 230].

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D. Philosophical Fragments

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Opening Comments

On page 153 of A Kierkegaard Anthology Bretall writes that Philosophical Fragments simply sets the stage for Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Brown disagrees. He feels that Kierkegaard's most important is the Philosophical Fragments and that the Concluding Unscientific Postscript should be understood as a postscript of the Philosophical Fragments. Up to this point Kierkegaard has pressed questions about Christian existence in terms of Hegelianism (with its failure to recognize distinctions of form/content or inner/outer realities) and Faith and Repentance. But now Kierkegaard turns to the subject of Christ and the Incarnation. What can be seen of God in Jesus? Where's the God-part? This is a central issue regarding the presence/action of God. The Postscript returns to the question of Christian existence.

Background

1844: Regine is engaged (marries Schlegel in 1847). Kierkegaard seems to be finally turning away from that problem (having been given a thorough working in Either/Or and Repetitions and Fear & Trembling). He turns to the central issue of Christology.

Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments constitute to Brown as Kierkegaard's equivalent to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments is his answer to the problem initiated by Lessing's Fragments, that is the question of historicity of Jesus of the Gospels and Jesus' identity. The similarities between Lessing's and Kierkegaard's Fragments is that both are called "Fragments" and that both were published by an "editor" (Lessing was editor for Reimarus and Kierkegaard was "editor" for Johannes Climacus).

1835: Strauss had published his Life of Jesus (I know this predates the first date, but that's the way the lecture was given). In this book Strauss suggested that the Jesus of the Gospels was unhistorical and argued for a Hegelian view. For the Strauss the incarnation of God was a mythical symbol of the union of God in human beings in general (plus the idea of mediation).

1841: (now we're really out of sync) Strauss' 2 volume work Christian Doctrine of Faith was translated to Danish by Kierkegaard's cousin H. Brochner, in which is discussed Lessing's Fragments, etc. Brown feels that this is where Kierkegaard got his knowledge of the whole controversy.

Title

It is a parody of Hegel's Scientific Philosophy (complete system-mentality). Kierkegaard was more or less sticking his tongue out at Hegel.

The source of the title entails at least two theories. The first involves what has already been mentioned regarding Lessing's Fragments. The second theory involves a quote of

Socrates. In Plato's Hippias Major (p 304a) Socrates is quoted as referring to his philosophizing as delving in "scrappings and bits of systematic thought."

The Author

Thulstrup [See, p 148, of which book, I'm not sure] mentions that Johannes Climacus was a real person. He was a monk at Mount Sinai that lived around 570. His christian name was John and the surname, "Climacus" was a sort of nickname given him by the book that he wrote, Klimax tou Paradeison ("Ladder to Paradise"). The book contained 30 chapters to correspond to the 30 years of Jesus' life. It dealt with the virtues and vices of a monk's life. [And now for a bit of trivia!!! This book, Klimax tou Paradeison was the first book printed in the New World, around 1500 in Spanish].

Kierkegaard wrote in his journal [See, Journals & Papers, 1575, vol 2, pp 279ff] that Hegel was a "Johannes Climacus; not a giant of faith, setting mountain upon mountain but climbs with words and syllogism." Hegel himself wrote in the Phenomenology of Spirit that his system was a ladder to scientific knowledge.

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III. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD

D. Philosophical Fragments

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Johannes Climacus

In A.V. Miller's translating of Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel writes regarding consciousness and the absolute that it consists of the Spirit actualizing its ideas in not only the physical world but also into the consciousness of those that see it in the world. Science, being understood as all understanding, is the ladder that provides individual with a consciousness of Spirit. Science is the key to absolute knowledge.

The writings of Johannes Climacus is Kierkegaard's response to Hegel. With Hegel is a system of science that provides the ladder of knowledge. With Kierkegaard it is an individual person. It is a personal ladder to absolute knowing - personal not "objective", what we can know.

Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms

Brown follows the understanding of Steven Evans [See, Evan, 1983] as the correct standpoint of Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms. This is different from MacKey's point of view [See, MacKey, pp 4-5]. MacKey writes that Kierkegaard undermines himself (on purpose) in Johannes Climacus' ridiculous claims and therefore in the end he has no real conclusions. Brown and Evans disagree and feel that Kierkegaard is trying to say something. At the conclusion of Concluding Unscientific Postscript Kierkegaard wrote a section entitled "First and Last Statement" under his own name in which he acknowledges his writing and that the purpose of his using pseudonyms was not to hide behind them but to represent different moral and philosophical standpoints. Thus Kierkegaard writes that he would appreciate that each respective pseudonym be acknowledge as the author their respective works. The result is that Kierkegaard doesn't present an absolute standpoint, but entertains a multitude of viewpoints. This was the only way that he felt that he could do philosophy. It is a bit of a more full blown version of the idea employed by Aquinas in his Summa Theologica where he begins each section with a question and then address that question from several perspectives before presenting some conclusion.

Johannes Climacus understands the logic of Christianity, he's a climber, but he doesn't claim to be a Christian.

The Motto

"Better well hung than ill wed," is taken from Shakespear's. It's from a German translation of Shakespear. In it the problem of the engagement resurfaces. The phrase

"well hung" reflects back to Galatians 2:20 about being crucified with Christ. Kierkegaard makes a reference to this in the Postscript [See, Postscript, p 3] about the reception of the Philosophical Fragment and about how when one renounces the world and the world ignores it (i.e., doesn't even take notice--poor book sales?) that that indeed is true renunciation.

The Title Page

The book is entitled, Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy. It thought or presented as just a "fragment" of philosophy. It belittles the work which asks how we can know something and how we can knowing anything about God. He is asking about the importance of the Historical.

Five Chapters

1. Project of Thought.
2. God As Teacher & Savior: Essay of Imagination.
3. The Absolute Paradox: A Metaphysical Crotchet.
4. The Case of the Contemporary Disciple.
5. The Disciple of the Second Hand.

Bretall includes sections from the first two chapters of the Book.

QUESTION: Is it that Kierkegaard doesn't see absolute truth in the Bible because of Kierkegaard sees the finiteness of human understanding?

Kierkegaard Questions what "absolute truth" means or whether there is an "absolute truth". We are not equipped for that kind of test. [See, Postscript, Book 1, chapter 1]. Reason demonstrates the limits of Reason. We're always wanting to prove the existence of God, but we end up showing that God is beyond Reason; thus Kierkegaard uses Reason to clear the way for Faith.

QUESTION: Regarding the title "Son of God", how does Kierkegaard address this as proving Jesus' divinity.

Brown feels that "Son of God" is not a divine title but a messianic title. This is not to deny Jesus' divinity but how we know his divinity is the question for Kierkegaard. MackKey writes that Kierkegaard rides Reason to the ground with his Divine Incognito and Faith in the Absurd and is therefore essentially nihilistic. Brown feels that this is to confuse Kierkegaard's method (maieutic) with his outlook.

Text: Chapter 1: A Project of Thought

Johannes Climacus talks about "the" God and "the" Teacher---he is talking about the hypothetical and talking formally about God and the logic of God becoming a human being. He is offering a formal account about how this works out. The crux of the argument is his quote of Wittgenstien about not being able to see God talking to someone else. Kierkegaard divides this chapter into three sections: A, B, C (to which Brown offers a heading).

Section "A": Socrates and His Method

How far does the Truth admit of being learned? With this question let us begin. It was a Socratic question, or became such in consequence of the parallel Socratic question with respect to virtue, sine virtue was again determined as insight. (Protagoras, Gorgias, Meno, Euthydemus.) In so far as the Truth is conceived as something to be learned, its non-existence is evidently presupposed, so that in proposing to learn it one make it the object of an inquiry. here we are confronted with the difficulty to which Socrates calls attention in the Meno (80, near the end) and there characterizes as a "pugnacious proposition"; one cannot seek for what he knows, and it seems equally impossible for him to seek for what he does not know. For what a man knows he cannot seek, since he knows it; and what he does not know he cannot seek, since he does not even know for what to seek. [See, Bretall, pp 154-155].

We've got a logical dilemma. This is a paradox of our human experience. In Greek thought learning is a matter of recalling knowledge from the realm of the Ideas from ones pre-existent form. Therefore Knowledge itself is a matter of recalling eternal truths. Hegel would later modify the Greek thought to the effect that to recollect and knowledge is to be in the presence of Spirit.

Kierkegaard writes that a teacher does not dispense truths but gives birth to truth. [See, Bretall, pp 166-169; Philosophical Fragments, p 12]. For Socrates, once a student's eyes have been opened then Socrates can vanish. Thus the when and the where of the learning are essentially meaningless. What is important is the occasion of learning. Therefore, by application, time and history are meaningless. What matters in Greek thought is the eternal consciousness. [See, Philosophical Fragments, pp 15-16].

Section "B": The State, The Teacher and the Disciple

Now if things are to be otherwise, the moment

in time must have a decisive significance, so that I will never be able to forget it either in time or eternity; because the eternal, which hitherto did not exist, came into being in this moment. Under this presupposition let us now proceed to consider the consequences for the problem of how far it is possible to acquire a knowledge of the Truth. [See, Bretall, p 157].

To the Greeks the teacher and the circumstances are meaningless. If the moment is to have greater significance, what then? That's the Pagan view. But because of the Passion of Christ and the Christian doctrine of Conversion the Christian view is that history has significance. Kierkegaard goes on to pose the question: Let's suppose that it is different. Kierkegaard then divides this development into three states: the Antecedent state, the Teacher and the Disciple.

(a) The Antecedent State

We begin with the Socratic difficulty about seeking the Truth, which seems equally impossible whether we have it or do not have it. The Socratic thought really abolishes this disjunction, since it appears that at bottom every human being is in possession of the Truth. This was Socrates' explanation; we have seen what follows from it with respect to the moment. Now if the latter is to have decisive significance, the seeker must be destitute of the Truth up to the very moment of his learning it; he cannot even have possessed it in the form of ignorance, for in that case the moment becomes merely occasional. What is more, he cannot even be described as a seeker. . . . He must therefore be characterized as beyond the pale of the Truth, not approaching it like a proselyte, but departing from it; or as being in Error. he is then in a state of Error. But how is he now to be reminded, or what will it profit him to be reminded of what he has not known, and consequently cannot recall? [See, Bretall, pp 157-158].

What is the Truth? it is the knowledge of Eternal Life, in this example. Ignorance and error because they think that they know.

(b) The Teacher

If the Teacher serves as an occasion by means of which the learner is reminded, he cannot help the learner to recall that he really knows the Truth; for the learner is in a state of Error. What the Teacher can give him occasion to remember is, that he is in Error. [See, Bretall,

p 158].

If teaching is recollection then teaching is bringing a knowledge that people are in a state of error. This is broken down into five ideas:

1. The teacher brings a knowledge of error. [See above quote].
2. The condition of the learner. The Non-Christian is in error and doesn't want to be told about it. It is not a matter of imparting knowledge but a change of condition.

. . . Now if the learner is to acquire the Truth, the Teacher must bring it to him; and not only so, but he must also give him the condition necessary for understanding it. For if the learner were in his own person the condition for understanding the Truth, he need only recall it. The condition for understanding the Truth is like the capacity to inquire for it: the condition contains the conditioned, and the question implies the answer. (Unless this is so, the moment must be understood in the Socratic sense).

. . . Insofar as the learner exists he is already created, and hence God must have endowed him with the condition for understanding the Truth. For otherwise his earlier existence must have been merely brutish, and the Teacher who gave him the truth and with it the condition was the original creator of his human nature. But insofar as the moment is to have decisive significance (and unless we assume this we remain at the Socratic standpoint) the learner is destitute of this condition, and must therefore have been deprived of it. this deprivation cannot have been due to an act of God (which would be a contradiction), nor to an accident (for it would be a contradiction to assume that the lower could overcome the higher); it must therefore be due to himself. If he could have lost the condition in such a way that the loss was not due to himself, and if he could remain in the state of deprivation without his own responsibility, it would follow that his earlier possession of the condition was accidental merely. But this is a contradiction, since the condition for understanding the Truth is an essential condition. [See, Bretall, pp 158, 159].

3. Sin. The condition of striving against being told is Sin.

The Teacher is then God himself, who in

action as an occasion prompts the learner to recall that he is in Error, and that by reason of his own guilt. But this state, the being in Error by reason of one's own guilt, what shall we call it? Let us call it Sin. [See, Bretall, 159].

4. Beginning to indicate that it takes god himself to bring human beings to himself. This teacher is also called: Savior, Redeemer, Atonement and Judge. [See, Bretall, p 161]. Teaching/revelation discloses the ignorance and guilt of the learner and discloses a teacher that does something about it.

5. The Moment.

And now the moment. Such a moment has a peculiar character. It is brief and temporal indeed, like every moment; it is transient as all moments are; it is past, like every moment in the next moment. And yet it is decisive, and filled with the eternal. Such a moment ought to have a distinctive name; let us call it the Fullness of Time. [See, Bretall, p 161].

This is revealing something about the learner, the teacher and time. It is very different from the Greek view. Not just successive moments but an element of the eternal and decisive: fulfilled time. There is a parallel with Barth's early concept of Transfigured time (which was in opposition of Cullman's "Linear Time").

(c) The Disciple

When the disciple is in a state of Error (and otherwise we return to Socrates) but is none the less a human being, and now receives the condition and the Truth, he does not become a human being for the first time, since he was a man already. But he becomes another man; not in the frivolous sense of becoming another individual of the same quality as before, but in the sense of becoming a man of a different quality, or as we may call him: a new creature. [See, Bretall, pp 161-162].

This is where re-birth fits into the logic of the thing.

- conversion
- repentance
- new birth

This is something that we can't do for ourselves. he is describing the Christian concept of regeneration/knowing God hypothetically, formally in comparison to the Pagan Greek thought of "Knowing".

There you have my project. but I think I hear someone say: "This is the most ridiculous of all projects; or rather, you are of all projectors of hypotheses the most ridiculous. For even when a man propounds something nonsensical, it may still remain true that it is he who has propounded it; but you behave like a lazzarone who takes money for exhibiting premises open to everybody's inspection; you are like the man who collected a fee for exhibiting a ram in the afternoon, which in the forenoon could be seen gratis, grazing in the open field."---"Perhaps it is so; I hide my head in shame. But assuming that I am as ridiculous as you say, let me try to make amends by proposing a new hypothesis. Everybody knows that gunpowder was invented centuries ago, and in so far it would be ridiculous of me to pretend to be the inventor; but would it be equally ridiculous of me to assume that somebody was the inventor? Now I am going to be so polite as to assume that you are the author of my project; greater politeness than this you can scarcely ask. Or if you deny this, will you also deny that someone is the author, that is to say, some human being? In that case I am as near to being the author as any other human being. So that your anger is not vented upon me because I appropriated something that belongs to another human being, but because I appropriated something of which no human being is the rightful owner; and hence your anger is by no means appeased when I deceitfully ascribe the authorship to you. . . . Be then angry with me and with whoever else pretends to the authorship of this thought; but that is no reason why you should be angry with the thought itself. [See, Bretall, pp 163-164].

This thought wasn't invented by any human being. Thus, two ways of knowing are contrasted.

The Text: Chapter 2: God As Teacher And Saviour: An Essay Of The Imagination

[Excursus]:

The logic of the book run parallel with Athanasius' On the Incarnation, in viewing the human condition we face up with the lack of knowledge of God and are in need of redemption.

What's the basic problem? It's a problem of Love. How we need love and how that love can come to us. Kierkegaard is allegorizing his own experiences and he reflects on the options found by God. What can God do in wanting to love and thus redeem human beings? How can God love without

annihilating the differences between them? Kierkegaard uses a fairie tale to describe the problem.

suppose then a king who loved a humble maiden. The heart of the king was not polluted by the wisdom that is loudly enough proclaimed; he knew nothing of the difficulties that the understanding discovers in order to to ensnare the heart, which keep the poets so busy and make their magic formulas necessary. It was easy to realize his purpose. Every statesman feared his wrath and dared not breathe a word of displeasure; every foreign state trembled before his power and dared not omit sending ambassadors with congratulations for the nuptials; no courtier groveling in the dust dared wound him, lest his own head be crushed. Then let the harp be tuned, let the songs of the poets begin to sound, and let all be festive while love celebrates its triumph. For love is exultant when it unites equals, but it is triumphant when it makes that which is unequal equal in love. ---Then there awoke in the heart of the king an anxious thought; who but a king who thinks kingly thought would have dreamed of it! He spoke to no one about his anxiety; for if he had, each courtier would doubtless have said: "Your majesty is about to confer a favor upon the maiden, for which she can never be sufficiently grateful her whole life long." This speech would have moved the king to wrath, so that he would have commanded the execution of the courtier for high treason against the beloved, and thus he would in still another way have found his grief increased. So he wrestled with his troubled thoughts alone. . . . Our problem is now before us. . . The poet's task will be to find a solution, some point of union, where love's understanding may be realized in truth, God's anxiety be set at rest, his sorrow banished. For the divine love is that unfathomable love which cannot rest content with that which the beloved might in his folly prize as happiness. [See, Bretall, pp 165, 167].

This is not a problem that can be satisfied by poets.

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III. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD

D. Philosophical Fragments

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Observations of the Philosophical Fragments, Chapter 2

1. All thought is from the imagination, moving from conjecture to explanation. The way that the book is set up communicates the progress from imagination to concept.
2. Socrates' Repeating Role. One needs to remember that Socrates was the subject of Kierkegaard's M.A. dissertation. In the chapter structure of the book Socrates is evident. That is, Kierkegaard begins each chapter with a reference to Socrates. He doesn't address Christianity directly. But this is bound up with his use of the maieutic method. This maieutic method also provides various side swipes of academia with its modern scholarship, that is, regarding its preoccupation with receiving awards and recognition. This is contrast to Socrates' impression that his award was getting his students to open their eyes. Another side swipe in terms of his is directed at Hegel and the thought that the teacher needs the students just as the students need their teacher. But God, on the other hand, doesn't need anyone.
3. God as the Unmoved Mover. [See, Philosophical Fragments, p 30]. God as the Unmoved Mover has relevance to the doctrine of the Immutability of God (which descends from Aristotelian thought). But this is not the same as saying that God is static. All other movers are changed in moving (i.e., caused causes) but God isn't. Therefore, God in making his move toward human beings as teacher, he is not changed nor effected outside of himself. This is because God is love. This is the justification for the move.
4. The Inequality of the Situation. Because of the differences between us and God's love for us, we end up with the Incarnation. (Kierkegaard approaches this conclusion much like Athanasius).
5. Analogy. How can we speak about God? This idea goes back to Aquinas. Words for God are not univocal (strictly literal, in all cases the same meaning; math symbols), nor are they equivocal (many literal meanings). Kierkegaard (actually Brown) felt that if you say that god is utter Other than how can you say anything meaningful about God at all? he doesn't really solve the problem. but he does address the subject of Analogy. [See, Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol 5, pp 96-98]. Brown says that if our language isn't able to communicate about God then we might as well quit and do something else with our lives. But even Kierkegaard, with all his talk about the Otherness of God, would draw an Analogy when referring to God.

The Medieval scholars used analogy in the sense of via negativa (the way of negation; what God is not). Kierkegaard used a method he called via affirmativa which is the proper use of Analogy. It's not a picture, or miniature of the actual things but a way of bringing the thing to mind---a symbol.

Ian Ramsey in Religious Language wrote that religious talk was one of models and qualifiers. Religious language works like a "light coming on" ("the penny dropping" to use an English phrase)---that is seeing the point of it. God is not addressed like he's a scaled-up version of whatever is being described. Ramsey, in his inaugural lectures on Miracles, pointed out that religious language was a method of map-making, much like scientific language. In scientific language, to achieve a necessary measure of precision one goes toward an abstraction of the phenomenon. In religious language (anthropological/behavior studies, as well) one looks for generalness and heads in the direction of basic description.

6. Regarding The Contemporary Danish Writer, Hans Christian Andersen. (1805-1875). It was a stiff relationship between Hans Andersen and Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard didn't much like what Andersen was doing. His stories were gaining in popularity just before Philosophical Fragments was written. Andersen's Fairie tales don't deal with magic or the supernatural but are ironical descriptions of the foibles of human nature. He is described in the Encyclopedia Britannica as being ambitious, high strung, quick witted (not at all like the sanitized Disney version). [See, Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol 7, pp 121-126].

Central Argument of Chapter 2

The problem: "Imagine that a king falls in love with a lowly maiden . . ."

The Text: Section A

Two false options open to the King (these options are false because either one wouldn't be true to love):

1. To change the maiden (learner):

The union might be brought about by an elevation of the learner. God would then take him up unto himself, transfigure him, fill his cup with millennial joys (for a thousand years are as one day in his sight), and let the learner forget the misunderstanding in tumultuous joy. Anla, the learner might perhaps be greatly inclined to prize such happiness as this. How wonderful suddenly to find his fortune made, like the humble maiden, because the eye of God

happened to rest upon him! And how wonderful also to be his helper in taking all this in vain, deceived by his own heart! Even the noble king could perceive the difficulty of such a method, for he was not without insight into the human heart, and understood that the maiden was at bottom deceived; and no one is so terribly deceived as he who does not himself suspect it, but is as if enchanted by a change in the outward habiliments of his existence. [See, Bretall, p 167].

This is a problem found frequently among the Prosperity-Theology mentalities. It results in simple worldliness. Christianity ends up as a means to self importance. If God would have delivered this success gospel they would have love him for it material gain (and not love).

2. The King should show himself to the learner in all his glory. This would result in dazzelling the learner and worship of the King.

The union might be brought about by God showing himself to the learner and receiving his worship, causing him to forget himself over the divine apparition. The the king might have shown himself to the humble maiden in all the pomp of his power, causing the sun of his presence to rise over her cottage, shedding a glory over the scene, and making her forget herself in worshipful admiration. Alas, and this might have satisfied the maiden, but it could not satisfy the king, who desired not his own glorification but hers. [See, Bretall, p 167].

Thus the end of the dilemma follows:

Who grasps this contradiction of sorrow: not to reveal oneself is the death of love, to reveal oneself is the death of the beloved. [See, Bretall, p 168].

Kierkegaard is using a theology of below/above, in some ways like Pannenburg. But it is not just observation, as if in a detached surface glance, but Kierkegaard is attempting to look at the problem from several different angles. Thus it is using proper language to call it a Theory of Imagination.

The Text: Section B

The "true solution" is that the king must assume a role of parity with the maiden. But it must not be just a disguise but he must become genuinely identified with the learner.

But the humblest is one who must serve other, and God will therefore appear in the form of a servant. But this servant-form is no mere outer garment, like the king's beggar-cloak, which therefore flutters loosely about him and betrays the king; it is not like the filmy summer-cloak of Socrates, which though woven of nothing yet both conceals and reveals. . .

Behold where he stands---God! Where? There; do you not see him? He is God; and yet he has not a resting-place for his head, and he dares not lean on any man lest he cause him to be offended. He is God; and yet he picks his steps more carefully than if angels guided them, not to prevent his foot from stumbling against a stone, but lest he trample human beings in the dust, in that they are offended in him. He is God; and yet his eye surveys mankind with anxious care, for the tender shoots of an individual life may be crushed as easily as a blade of grass. . .

But the servant-form was no mere outer garment, and therefore God must suffer all things, endure all things, make experience of all things. He must suffer hunger in the desert, he must thirst in the time of his agony, he must be forsaken in death, absolutely like the humblest--behold the man! His suffering is not that of his death, but his entire life is a story of suffering; and it is love that suffers, the love which gives all is itself in want. What wonderful self-denial! . . .

Every other form of revelation would be deception in the eyes of love; for either the learner would first have to be changed, and the fact concealed from him that this was necessary (but love does not alter the beloved, it alters itself); or there would be permitted to prevail a frivolous ignorance of the fact that the entire relationship was a delusion. [See, Bretall, pp 168, 169].

It's not deception. He was not a kind of superman, man on the inside with God on the inside, but it was a complete assumption of the servant role. To the point that the divinity can't be directly revealed. It's an Incarnation but what is it that you see? You can't break it down like some sort of disguise.

The Text: Chapter 3: The Absolute Paradox - A Metaphysical Crotchet

"Crotchet" means an eccentric opinion, a whim. This is central to philosophy according to Brown. Kierkegaard addresses the scope and use of reason, the nature of the

Argument, asks "Can one prove the existence of God?"

He begins with Socrates (again). The point of the discussion is to introduce the point: "Certain issues in philosophy are paradoxical and philosophy by nature is paradoxical." That is, philosophical thinking is general in its approach. It must make certain assumptions that are axiomatic, upon which reason is founded. Therefore, according to Kierkegaard the foundation of our rationality is essentially irrational.

Socrates wasn't sure what it was to be a human being. Was it that humans have a spark of the divine or are they essentially monsters? It's not something that is open to direct inspection.

Kierkegaard feels that philosophy involves passion. One is trying to be objective and intimate with Truth, but what's the motive to get at Truth? Isn't it a passion for Truth. Kierkegaard writes that "Reason desires it's own downfall." [See, Philosophical Fragments, p 46]. Axiomatic thought, the foundation of knowledge, is indemonstrable. No one knows absolutely. Therefore it's a matter of irrationality, it's beyond the scope of reason.

Can you rationally demonstrate the existence of God? Kierkegaard feels that in using the various arguments for the existence of God one is merely developing the content of a concept and not proving the concepts existence. It's existence is assumed. [See, Philosophical Fragments, pp 48ff]. Can we get from thought---one from another? No! In developing thought we prove its applicability. We're simply unpacking the definition. We from a hypothesis because we wanted to prove the faith that we originally had. One may think that this is absurd but what Kierkegaard is doing parallel with what others do when others think that they are proving the existence of God.

The chapter ends with an objection (like the previous chapter). The Absolute Paradox---The Otherness of God, Christianity involves contrary propositions that can't be resolved.

The Text: Chapter 4: The Contemporary Disciple

Kierkegaard again begins with reflections on Socrates and the desire to go beyond him [See, Philosophical Fragments, p 68]. One merely has an understanding that it is a paradox and thus there is no advantage to being (or having been) a chronological contemporary of Jesus of Nazareth. [See, Philosophical Fragments, pp 72, 76, 83-84].

What is historical fact? The historical fact which can become an object only for faith of which no human being cannot communicate to another, that is, which indeed can be communicated to another but not so that the other believes it and which if communicated in the former thing is certain is so communicated as to

prevent the other, so far as possible, from accepting it immediately. If the facts spoken of were simple historical facts the accuracy of the historical sources would be of grave importance, yet this is not the case. For faith cannot be discovered by merely the nicest accuracy of the eternal. The historical fact that the God has been in human form is the essence of the matter. The rest of the detail is not even as important as if we had to do with a human being instead of with the God. If the contemporary generation had left behind nothing but these words, "We believe that in such and such a year, that God appeared among us in the form of a humble servant, that he lived and taught in our community, and finally died." It would be more than enough. The contemporary generation would have done all that was necessary. And this little advertisement, this letter burning on the page of universal human history would be sufficient to afford an occasion for a successor and the most voluminous account can, in all eternity, be nothing more. If we wish to express the relations subsistent between a contemporary and his successor, in the briefest possible context without sacrificing accuracy for brevity we may say, the successor believed by means of this expresses the means of the culture, the testimony of the contemporaries, and in virtue of the condition he himself received from God. There is no disciple who is second hand, the first and the last are essentially on the same plane. Only the related generation finds it secure in the testimony of a contemporary generation while the contemporary generation on this occasion remits to its own immediate contemporaneity, and in so far is nothing than any other generation. [See, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp 130-131].

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III. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD
D. Philosophical Fragments

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Concluding Thoughts: The Final Chapter

FIVE KEY THOUGHTS

1. Kierkegaard's contention was that the central fact of Christ exists for faith alone (1843). Once removed from the initial shock of the Incarnation of Christ, that is, God in human form - it has become naturalized (p. 119) by its effects - that is social transformation via Christ and the Church. But the paradox remains, a paradox which exists for faith alone. It is a fact for Faith alone. We are not saying that all we're left with is that the early Church believed (Easter faith). Faith takes us to the belief that they believed in. History can't tell us whether to believe or not to believe. Therefore we are in the same position logically speaking as the first generation of believers were in because history can only take us to the fact that they believed and the data that they believed in. Therefore, we are contemporaries with them.
2. What can a contemporary do for a successor? (p. 128)
Kierkegaard has two answers:
 1. One can inform him that he has believed in the Incarnation of Christ, that is providing an occasion for belief.
 2. One can relate the content of the facts. But without Faith it's all meaningless. Example, sounds are to hearing colors as the historical data is to the heart without faith, meaningless.

QUESTION: Is Faith an "Organ"?

Faith is not an organ among other organs, eg., hearing and seeing but it is the response of the whole Being.

What can be communicated, therefore? Affirmations wouldn't say faith is a form of knowledge; We are not able to objectify it like other kinds of knowledge. How can it be trusted then? Kierkegaard lays bare the logical structure of the situation. Not skeptical conclusion such as those of Bultmann and his restructuring of the canonical history. The validity of the question is cleared by testimony and faith, according to Kierkegaard.

3. What is the logic of Faith? (p. 131)
The logic of faith is that is received from God in the testimony of the contemporaries and the condition of faith itself. In this life we never get beyond faith.

4. Therefore, there is no such thing as a disciple at second hand. We (and all generations) have the testimony of the successors and the occasion of Faith, just like the 1st generation. In this we have a sort of one-to-one correspondence.

5. Conclusion (p. 132-139).

He addresses objections (like he always does) about the ideas previously stated, that these ideas are not original, etc. He introduces the idea of writing a sequel, something of a more more serious consideration.

Morals

Again with the Socratic question---the hypothetical method. This time the main performers are:

Faith ---> the new faculty

God ---> the new teacher

1. Similarly to previous chapter he begins with an objection.

2. He presents it as a hypothesis, i.e., a conjectured explanation, interpretation of Christianity. But there is no way of concluding this as logical exclusive options.

3. he compares the problem with Socrates' Yes and No.

Can one get beyond Socrates? On socrates' premises, No! But by introducing new factors it is possible to go beyond Socrates.

FAITH/MOMENT/TEACHER

He Answers the Title's Questions

1. Only if God enters into time as teacher.

2. All ordinary events have ordinary historical interest. Only is God is teacher.

3. Eternal happiness? No, but is important to history. It becomes an occasion for getting beyond Faith. It is in the truest sense "meaningful."

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E. Concluding Unscientific Postscript

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Form

The book is set up much like Either/Or as two "book" (although it was published in one volume). The first part deals with the Objective Problem of the Truth of Christ (a tremendous 30 pages spent on this one folks!), while the second part deals with the Subjective problem of the Truth of Christ---the problem of "Becoming" in Christ (a balanced 500 plus pages).

Author

Johannes Climacus is responsible for this treatise. He is looking in an odd way, an "objective" way at Christianity (a detached way) at arguments/formed out of Christianity.

Comments on Postscript

Looking at Objective Christianity. His introductory remarks, the perspective of the book, is found on pages 23 and following. It is that:

Christianity is a thing posited in fact

How does one test the truth of the Objective Truth in an objective way?

1. Historically---> Biblical Criticism
2. Philosophically---> Hegel's Idealistic philosophy (which he proposed as the objective truth which undergirds Christianity).

The examiner must be in one of two states:

1. in Faith, and therefore not interested really in any other position (outside of the dictates of faith).
2. outside of Faith, and therefore not really interested in the first position.

Can these two positions be brought into relation to each other? Johannes Climacus says, No. There is no point of transition

-Scripture	\	"All historical knowledge
-the Church	}	is at best, approximate."
-the Proof of the Centuries	/	(p. 25)

For the one with Faith this is a big problem. This is because if ones eternal consequences are based on an approximation, this just isn't going to be good enough.

A. Scripture (p. 26) is the court of last resort regarding doctrines. But the Scriptures themselves must be established regarding authorship/date/critical problems/etc. Kierkegaard reflects upon Cicero---academic work and external consequences. Kierkegaard applies some to the New Testament (See Luther's attitude toward the New Testament book of James in this regards---it undermines absolute/incontestable certainty that is needed to qualify as a objective verified truth).

"Faith doesn't result from scientific inquiry"

Within Scripture there appears to be a contradiction and work done on the text (Critical Research) results only in approximations. It is therefore not good enough. "One must move beyond approximations to faith which involves a leap."

B. The Church (p. 35). Lost faith in the Scriptures was given to the Church as the custodian of Faith. What is true of Scriptures is true of the Church. Who's the spokesman? Contradictions. Historical validity of itself but not Faith.

C. The Longevity of the Church, What does it prove? (The Quest of the Ages).

All that can be said is that the Church has been around along time (see the Islamic religion, which has been around just about as long). This doesn't substantiate its truth. On the negative side (as if we need more on the negative side . . .) Christianity can be undermined by its history. The existence of the historical Christ, the resurrection, Apostolic Kerygma, etc.---but history on the positive side presents facts and leaves you to decide regarding Faith.

History provides us with a point of contact to the Eternal; the Subject/Object Question. It is not what we believe but how we are related---this is not the same as saying that it is meaningless what one believes---but it is the truth that one relates to! This is not a working toward universalism but a question of how one is related to the truth of Christ---focusing on subject relation to the Truth of Christ. There is a affinity with what Aquinas wrote. That is, we can't say what God is---but subject relatedness to God.

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III. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD
E. Concluding Unscientific Postscript
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Observations on Postscript

1. The Book's Theme. (p. 20)

The objective problem - the Truth of Christ

The objective problem - relation to Christ

Philosophical Fragments asked: "What is the nature of Christ?" (the Absolute Paradox---> the Incarnation).

Postscript asks: "How do I relate to it."

2. Key to Understanding what Kierkegaard's Saying in
Philosophical Fragments and Postscript (PS, p. 20):

Objectifiers are guilty of metabasis eis allo genos ("jumping from one species to another"). In the desire for objective truth regarding Christ and objective truth one risks doing what Aristotle said. Aristotle said that in an argument you can't switch categories. That is, you can't prove the truths in geometry with the truths of arithmetic.

Three part of a proof:

1. The thing being demonstrated
2. axiom appealed to
3. naming genus - attributes.

One cannot draw a straight line and ask if it is more beautiful than a curved line. This is because a curved line belongs to geometry and beauty is of a different category. Therefore God exists in a different category which leads to the position that no strict logical proof of Christianity exists. God comes to us as Other, sui generis. Subject and not object. We can't address God from within our category (Kantian). (See, Fear and Trembling, regarding the teleological suspension of the ethic---God is higher than the ethical which is absurd to objective reality). [HISTORICAL NOTE: Kierkegaard was studying Aristotle at the time].

3. What Kierkegaard calls "Paradox" is "mystery" to other Religious (Medieval) Thinkers. (eg., Aquinas, Summa Theologica). Mystery---> absurd.

4. Kierkegaard and Humor.

Brown's suggestion. Lessing wrote a series of studies on the theory of Drama. That is, that Tragedy is for the passions and comedy is for reasoning. This goes along with Aristotle's idea of Catharsis and the audiences identification with the Tragic heroes. Regarding Kierkegaard, he identified himself as a humorist. Through humor he brings the serious to us but doesn't want us to emote with it, but to recognize the truth and where humor leaves off.

Overview

In the first part of the Postscript Kierkegaard rejects the possibility of Christ being proved rationally. In the second part the thesis is attributed to Lessing.

Thoughts regarding Lessing

With the thesis the point wasn't to quote Lessing as an objective judge of the truth, "Lessing says it therefore it must be true." Johannes Climacus sees in Lessing a kindred spirit - another kind of pseudonymous author. Lessing, enlightened figure, probing questions, investigating lines of thought that he thought would bring one to Christ. "What is the significance of history in the truth of Christianity?"

At the end of Lessing's life he confessed to Jakobi of being a Spinozist. Shock. This prompted the quest for the historical Lessing (what did he really believe?)---pantheism controversy (Pantheismusstreit, German).

Lessing's Ugly Ditch was the leaping from truths of history to theological/metaphysical truths such as that Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God. Can strong approximation and probability but not proof, it is just a hypothesis. Kierkegaard says that we have to live with the hypothesis. To Lessing God is all truth right hand; left hand--pursuit, choose of hand [?] (PS, p. 97, Bretall, p. 195).

Excursus

(Bretall, p. 133-134, PS, p. 164) Johannes Climacus achieved nothing in his life, sees others contributing to society, making things easier for humankind. Therefore Johannes decides to make things more difficult for people, regarding Christianity.

Regarding Logic and Systems

Regarding the use of logic in human systems. Quote (p. 195)
"Here . . . there is no system." Herod/Pilate were 2
secular judges on Jesus (per Brown)[?] What is wrong with
the system? It is incomplete and an incomplete system is no
system. Kierkegaard reflects on why it'll never be
completed. He gives 2 reasons (Bretall, p. 196):

1. logical system it is possible
2. existential system it is impossible

1. Logical systems, Kantianism, analytical truth and
truth; logic excludes motive and movement is part of
existence. He rejects Hegel's system as a confusion of
categories. He criticizes Hegel's immediacy. (See,
Thulstrup commentary, p. 225). How does this differ from
Nothing? How does one get pure undifferentiated beginning?
It doesn't use a logical demonstration. Kierkegaard goes
back to pure Being (Hegel); through Hegel's concept of
Infinity. Good Infinity is completeness, whole/complex,
consisting of the supplementary parts. Bad Infinity is
finitude raised to the highest power. Kierkegaard
criticizes his use of "bad", a moral category, in a logical
argument. Therefore Hegel is doing a "leap" for all of his
talk about objective systems. (Bretall, p 198-199)

2. Existential systems exists for God but we're not in a
position to do it, because we don't have Absolute or
comprehending Being to do it. There are two ways (p. 202-
203)

Central Contention

(p. 205) Absolute Idealism tries to do away with Subject and
Object as just parts of the system. But existing
individuals must contend with Subject/Object. One must step
back from existence and reflect upon existence, eg., Praxis
and thought regarding Spirituality. But we must take into
account that we are part of existence.

Becoming Subjective

(Book 2, Part 2, Chapter 1; Postscript, p. 115, Bretall, p.
207).

1. Subjective acceptance is the issue. Objective
acceptance is paganism or thoughtlessness. It reduces God
to an object of time and space.
2. Christ is concerned with the response of the individual
subject. It is a one-to-one affair.

3. The real problem is the difficulty of being subjective .
The paradox is that it is easy to be subjective, Kierkegaard
feels it is opposite (Bretall, p 208-209).

4. Parallel in instances of individuality which we admire
---> heroes/lovers- being subjective. Kierkegaard discusses
Faith as a passion in two ways (p. 210):

- A. it involves a subjective emotion
- B. it involves suffering

Comparable with thought; Object of Faith is absurd.

5. Objective approach tends to make one a mere observer or
calculator. Christianity does the opposite to people (See,
Bretall, p. 210).

Truth is Subjectivity

(Book 2, Part 2, Chapter 2; Bretall, p. 210-211). The point
is ones subjective standpoint. Not what is true but how we
are related to the truth.

How is this related to God ---> because God is not an object
(p. 211). This involves Inwardness which leads to God (p.
212). This is posed as a question: How can one flesh this
out? Brown feels that it is possible to have false ideas
and still worship the true God. No one idea of God is
completely correct in every way. (See 2 Kings 5:18ff
regarding Nahaam in the pagan temple, or Acts 17:28ff Paul
at Athens quotes 2 greek poets regarding God).

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III. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD
E. Concluding Unscientific Postscript
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1st Comment: Regarding Analogy

(PS, pp. 32, 59). Truth about God---> we must use analogy; as Jesus did in the parables. Parables objectively is not God; how does the parable relate to God? Through the parable to the meaning beyond mere symbolism (object). The point is what God is saying through the parables (Bible). "How" relationship and not "what" relationship.

2nd Comment: Regarding Wittgenstein

(Philosophical Investigations, pt. 1, paragraph 114). Statements are made tracing an objective truth but actually is tracing the framework of the things forms, not thoughts transference. One must grasp through the object to the subject. The importance of Subjectivity (See, Bretall, pp. 213-214).

3rd Comment: Definition of Truth

(Bretall, p 214). We are not interested in just the abstract definition. Thinking about Christ and offering is a logical expression of Christianity. Passionate inwardness.

4th Comment: Paradox

Two types:

a. Formally the truth is paradoxical. Religious language by its nature is paradoxical. The appearance of objectivity is deceptive. (p. 215)

b. Eternal in time (pp. 218, 219).

5th Comment: Reflections on the Absurd

(p. 220). The central tenet is absurd; believing that we can resolve the paradox is absurd! (Do you get the message?)

6th Comment: Speculative Philosophy

We are not in a position to know. What follows is basically a repetition of these ideas: Conclusion-object/subject . . .

What is it to become a Christian?

Objectively:

1. Accept the doctrines of Christ. "What is the Christian doctrines?"
2. Appropriation. "Wearing the party badge." (p. 253)
3. Be properly baptized. (It is still an approximation, a form . . .)

Subjectively:

1. Faith (p. 255). Specifically related to Christianity. Faith is like passion and suffering.

Concludes with a Story

". . . On account of the wig . . ." (p. 258). The story is repeated without change. Began with faith, ends with faith. It never progresses beyond faith; it must live with the paradox. If they would have only sworn by the wig---objectivity is okay to a point. Question is how it is related to the truth in itself. What the traveler thought he saw and testifies to what the robber testifies to---who is telling the truth?

In Religious matters, truth can't be resolved only on a purely objective phenomenological basis.

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F. Concept of Anxiety

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Background

- the circumstances of it publication
- Kierkegaard's views on Anxiety in general
- Kierkegaard's views on psychology
- the text

The Circumstances of it Publication

It was published on June 18, 1844, 4 days after the Philosophical Fragments. These two books form another one of Kierkegaard's infamous pairs:

PF--> God's action in history in the incarnation (subjective)

CA--> The human condition for which the incarnation is the answer.

It was a major work of Kierkegaard but it didn't attract any attention.

Kierkegaard's views on Anxiety in general

(Journals & Papers, vol 1, # 91-104, pp 38-42). Anxiety, what does he mean?

Dread ---> fear intensified with a specific object

Anxiety --> much more pervasive without a specific object

(#94). Anxiety grips us; enthralled and dread of it. A component factor in our understanding of Original Sin.

(#95). What made Adam and Eve susceptible to sin? Anxiety!

(#96). That which makes believers turn to pray to God. Unbelievers will fall in love with nature, that will satisfy them (Hamann). Kierkegaard feels that it is the distinguishing characteristic between humanity and the animals.

(#97). One without anxiety is either an angel or an animal, certainly less than human. We mustn't treat anxiety as an imperfection to be cured from or eliminated. But bound up with sin or original sin. [Innocent desire to know--Anxiety over nothing, CA, pp. 41-44, 61ff, 77, 96-103]

Kierkegaard's views on psychology

The title: Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychology Oriented Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin. Kierkegaard's method was introspection and reflection on the dogma of original sin and the correlation of the two. The general psychological method, on the other hand, involved the empirical method and hypothesis.

Kierkegaard doesn't go for objective observation; nor is the remedy like modern psychology--no empirical remedy. (CA, p. 79, "Know thyself.")

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III. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD
F. Concept of Anxiety

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Introductory Points

1. Kierkegaard's View on Psychology

Kierkegaard's concept of Anxiety is bound up with original sin. He uses the term hereditary sin or inherited sin. The Danish/German words are Arvesunden/Erbsunde. The question is how this sin relates to Adam.

2. Methodology

1. Subjective - he introspects/reflects on his own sin and the sins of other people. When talking about psychology he's referring to introspection.

2. "A Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue . . ." He is dealing with it as a dogma. He tests it and how it relates to human experience. He is not really concerned with the historical foundations (dogma) but uses it as a hypothesis ---> possible way of looking at things to clear things up.

3. Corelation. He corelates his experience with this dogma

The Text: Introduction

1. Sin isn't a scientific category (p. 21) per Hegelianism or psychology.

Excursus: the problem of sin and psychology

Brown feels that integration is impossible. One must recognize the limits of the perspective fields and deal with the problems in their own fields --- recognizing the overlaps.

2. Hegelianism effectively does away with sin through merging the infinite and the finite; therefore making everything a product of the infinite mind. The gulf between god and man is just moments in the process.

3. The role of Psychology is to observe phenomenon, the human predicament, "like a spy" (p. 15) secretly observing. One can do analysis on observation but it can't cure because the human problem is theological. It is a case of how humans relate to God. Antidote to anxiety is Faith (p. 162).

4. Dogmatics. Working from a presupposition of it doesn't explain Original Sin, it presupposes it (pp. 19-20).

The Text: Chapter 1

1. Anxiety is a presupposition of Original Sin. It reflects on Gen. 3 --- explain it in terms of anxiety not ultimate example but retrogressive explanation working with present Reality.

2. Historical Intimations

He looks at both the Catholic and Protestant statements and differences. For the Catholics man's original righteousness was a super-added gift which was lost in the Fall.

"Ridiculous," says Kierkegaard, it's just another theological construct designed to preserve another tenet. Federal theology (Covenant) explanation is "historical fantasy," i.e., absurd, according to Kierkegaard. he doesn't want to see it as Adam sinned and we all sin. Kierkegaard feels that Adam is an archetypal figure and some type. "How does our sin relate to the first sin and sin in general?" Question depends on how you understand Adam. "He is himself and the race."

3. Concept of the First Sin

How can we conceive of the first sin? Sin came into being by a qualitative leap which was actualized by the first sin. An enigma, no ultimate rational explanation of sin. Sin comes in by virtue of being sin. Kierkegaard rejects the Pelagian view that each human sin is following Adam's example.

4. Concept of Innocence

He attacks the Hegelian view (pp. 30ff) lost by guilt. Innocents is ignorance. Adam didn't know the concept of good and evil before the Fall.

5. Concept of the Fall

Sorrowing over our sinfulness. It is the difference between our condition and Jesus'.

6. Concept of Anxiety

Innocence has no actual knowledge of Evil. He discusses dreaming [?] as the only place to envisage pure innocence. He discusses the difference between fear and anxiety. The beast in the field has no anxiety.

BODY <---- physical

SOUL <---- the animated component

SPIRIT <-- that which separates us from the Beasts -
envisage of good and bad things.

Anxiety and nothing (the fear of potentiality) p. 44.

Hopes, "What if Adam had not sinned?" Unanswerable question. Anxiety is a component part of our existence. p. 50.

The Text: The Final Chapter

1. Anxiety as Saving through Faith

Curious enough anxiety can point to faith. It is like in Grimm's fairie tale, that there are 2 ways of perishing:

- a. Avoiding anxiety altogether (living at the level of the beasts - aesthetic/materialistic life)
- b. Succumbing to anxiety and ending in despair.

2. What to do:

- a. Recognize that anxiety is part of our existence (the greater the anxiety the greater the humanness [?]).
- b. Anxiety is freedom toward possibility (through faith).
- c. Those without anxiety are spiritless (p. 157). Faith is the means of overcoming anxiety. Faith is condition of salvation - saves us from anxiety.

Conclusion

The Atonement is the answer to Anxiety. Psychology examines the human condition but handed over to dogmatics in the end.

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G. The Edifying Discourses

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Preliminary Thoughts

(Bretall, pp 108-116). These thoughts are taken from The Point of View For My Work As An Author (pp. 18ff). He offered Either/Or with the left hand and 2 edifying discourses with the right. And while the world received Either/Or, the 2 discourses went unnoticed.

It's a subjective approach to truth. He is concerned with how the existing subjects respond to words and receive them.

He repeats the text - gives subjective response to how one would apply it.

1. aesthetic/objective element recognized
2. reflection of the indifference of the majority
 - a. takes God's goodness objectively. The words of the apostles sink in.
 - b. significance of the individual. One must appropriate truth on an individual level. The majority is usually wrong. Only the individual suffers and gains understanding of the Truths

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III. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD

H. Sickness Unto Death

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Thoughts on Sickness Unto Death

1. We are introduced to an new pseudonym, Anticlimacus. He thinks of Anticlimacus as a committed Christian (verses Johannes Climacus understands the form of Christianity but not in Christ); Kierkegaard is somewhere in between getting people to feel the need (See, Journals and Papers, vol 6, #6521, p 242 - the role as a poet). he reflects on Bishop Mynster, enchanted with the skills but forgetting the ideal.
2. His primary concern is for ruthless honesty - not kidding oneself. The criticism of Mynster is a confusion between the difference of God and the world. (JP, 6433)

Johannes Climacus/Anticlimacus	
/	\
self-thought low	self-thought a Christian
not a Christian	Christianity is for genius' in
	an non-intellectual sense (i.e., he
	has the Spirit)

(JP, 6449 - comments on Martensen's dogmatics)

3. The Character of Sickness Unto Death

(JP, 6110, p. 435) Ideas for a new book, thoughts that cure radically; Christian healing regarding the atonement. (JP, 6535) Waiting to say that Sickness Unto Death is about himself, not a prescription for a cure for "you".
4. Kierkegaard's View of the Self and Despair

(JP, vol 1, 68) Being is composite (temporal and eternal) beings experience despair. Despair is the misalignment of the temporal and the eternal. The answer isn't to resolve the dualism but to become transparent to the Ground of Being (JP, 3887). Man isn't to merge away into into the God consciousness.
5. Sin

(JP, 4020) Sin is not belief as present in self.
6. The books is titled after John 11:14. Reflects on various forms of sickness and what is the true form of sickness unto death (despair)

The Text

1. (NCE, pp 17-21, Bretall, pp 31-32).

1. Self-consuming \ it is a
2. despair --- it is despair over something } kind of
all or nothing / living death

2. What is the ultimate Remedy?

You can't cheer up a despairing person---but to face up to the situation, not boasting up oneself with self appoint criteria good or bad. The opposite of despair is Faith; face up to the situation and come to God in faith.

J. The Attack Upon Christendom

Comments

Mynster and Martensen were mediating theologians, wanting to mediate the true faith in modern times. The problem for Kierkegaard regarding Mynster was that he was sending mixed signals. The cost of discipleship was missing.

What is Kierkegaard saying? Honesty! "Witness", builds upon the thought of marturos, martyr---> suffering and witnessing. Thus what you end up with Christendom is people making a comfortable career from Christianity ("giving awards away to each other," self-importance). The problem of containing the truth, but not the whole truth which is disjointed with the lived-experience.

Two Points

1. 21 articles from the Fatherland --- was Mynster a witness of the truth ---> shift of Kierkegaard's target from Hegelianism to Mynster's Christianity. (1854 through May '55).
2. The Moment Pamphlets ("The Temporal Encountering the Eternal") (May 10, 1855 through November 11, 1855).
 - a. "What do I want?" HONESTY! (Bretall, p 439)
 - b. Eulogy upon the Human Race (Bretall, pp. 442ff)
Everyone is a Christian and the New Testament is false (according to the Danish church).
 - c. Short and Sharp. Irony of the Church and its lost ideal (Bretall, p. 448).

d. What says the Fire Chief? (Bretall, pp. 448ff). The Fire chief is polite in his private life but in an emergency he takes charge and tells those that would impede his duty to get the hell out of his way! This is Kierkegaard's excuse.

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¹There is an interesting comment made by Victor Eremita regarding his indecision to purchase the cupboard: he says to himself, "'You must make up you mind,' I thought, 'for suppose it is sold, then it will be too late. Even if you were lucky enough to get hold of it again, you would never have the same feeling about it.'"

²A few selections not covered in class but nonetheless meaningful to me:

How absurd men are! They never use the liberties they have, they demand those they do not have. They have freedom of thought, they demand freedom of speech. [See, p 19].

I feel the way a chessman must, when the opponent says of it: That piece cannot be moved. [See, p 21].

My soul is so heavy that thought can no more sustain it, no wingbeat lift it up into the ether. If it moves, it sweeps along the ground like the low flight of birds when a thunderstorm is approaching. Over my inmost being there broods a depression, an anxiety, that presages an earthquake. [See, p. 28].

It happened that a fire broke out backstage in a theater. The clown came out to inform the public. They thought it was a jest and applauded. He repeated his warning, they shouted even louder. So I think the world will come to an end amid general applause from all the wits, who believe that it is a joke. [See, p 30].

It is quite remarkable that one gets a conception of eternity from two of the most appalling contrasts in life. If I think of that unhappy bookkeeper who lost his reason from despair at having involved his firm in bankruptcy by adding 7 and 6 to make 14; if I think of him day after day, oblivious to everything else, repeating to himself: 7 and 6 are 14, then I have an image of eternity. ---If I imagine a voluptuous feminine beauty in a harem, reclining on a couch in all charming grace, without concern for

anything in all the world, then I have a symbol
for eternity. [See, p 31].

Wine can no longer make my heart glad; a little of it makes me sad, much makes me melancholy. My soul is faint and impotent; in vain I prick the spur of pleasure into its flank, its strength is gone, it rises no more to the royal leap. I have lost my illusions. Vainly I seek to plunge myself into the boundless sea of joy; it cannot sustain me, or rather, I cannot myself. Once pleasure had but to beckon me and I mounted, light of foot, sound, and unafraid. When I rode slowly through the woods, it was as if I flew; now when the horse is covered with lather and ready to drop it seems to me that I do not move. I am solitary as always; forsaken, not by men, which could not hurt me, but by the happy fairies of joy, who used to encircle me in countless multitudes, who met acquaintances everywhere, everywhere showed me an opportunity for pleasure. As an intoxicated man gathers a wild crowd of youths about him, so they flocked about me, the fairies of joy, and I greeted them with a smile. My soul has lost its potentiality. If I were to wish for anything, I should not wish for wealth and power, but for the passionate sense of the potential, for the eye which, ever young and ardent, sees the possible. Pleasure disappoints, possibility never. And what wine is so sparkling, what so fragrant, what so intoxicating, as possibility. [See, p 40].

Music finds its way where the rays of the sun cannot penetrate. My room is dark and dismal, a high wall almost excludes the light of day. The sounds must come from a neighboring yard; it is probably some wandering musician. What is the instrument? A flute? . . . What do I hear--the minuet from Don Juan! Carry me then away once more, O tones so rich and powerful, to the company of the maidens, to the pleasures of the dance. ---The apothecary pounds his mortar, the kitchen maid scours her kettle, the groom carries the horse, and strikes the comb against the flagstones; these tones appeal to me alone, they beckon only me. O! accept my thanks, whoever you are! My soul is so rich, so sound, so joy-intoxicated! [See, p 41].

³Role Modeling. Paul tells the Corinthian believers, ". . .

===={ TH531: KIERKEGAARD, Fuller Seminary, Fall '85 }====
CRITICAL COMMENTS

I urge you to imitate me." (1 Cor. 4:16) This is the basis, as I understand it, for the Evangelical belief in role modeling. I'm not sure to what extent Paul would have us follow his example, certainly it is an interesting citation in view of the factions that were contending for a position of authority in the Corinthian church.

The point of separation between the Apostolic command and the gist of Kierkegaard's (Brown's) idea appears to be that the Apostle wants the believer's to follow his example, at least as far as seeing the connection between ones words and ones actions [See, The New Bible Commentary: Revised, p 1057]. Kierkegaard on the other hand seems to say that this is not only meaningless but quite impossible. The true believer (the Knight of Faith) actually can be accused of Philistinism in view of his supposed "worldliness" [See, Bretall, p 119]. I suppose the thing that needs to be understood is that Kierkegaard is speaking to an audience that relegated Christianity into a specific Cultural pattern that in its totality misses the core of the matter: Faith.

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